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Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a
Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts
Committed by Government Officials
by MICHAEL P. LEHMANN*
Introduction
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in
the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics. I The Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures gives rise to a cause of
action for damages even in the absence of specific congressional authoriza-
tion.2 The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to determine what the
Supreme Court held in Bivens, second, to analyze how lower federal courts
* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1977.
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2. Id. at 395-97. For prior discussions of this case, see generally L. LEVY, AGAINST THE
LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 68-75 (1974); Dellinger, Of Rights and Reme-
dies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534-38, 1553-55 (1972); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Violation of the Fourth Amendment by Federal
Agents Gives Rise to Cause of Action for Damages, 24 ALA. L. REV. 131-45 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law-Damages: Unreasonable Search by Federal Agents Under Color of Au-
thority Provides a Federal Cause of Action for Damages Under the Fourth Amendment, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 522-31 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-DamagesforFourth Amendment
Violations by Federal Agents, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 1135-42 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-
Search and Seizure-Federal Cause of Action for an Illegal Search and Seizure, 10 DUQUESNE
L. REV. 710-16 (1972); Note, Bivens v. Federal Bureau of Narcotics: A New Dimension for the
Fourth Amendment, 5 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 325-41 (1972); Note, The Constitution as
Positive Law: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 5 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 126-61 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-
Unreasonable Search and Seizure Gives A Right of Action for Damages Against Federal
Narcotics Agents: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 205-09 (1972); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-FederalAgents
Conducting Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Are Liable for Damages Under the Fourth
Amendment, 50 TEX. L. REV. 798-806 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Federal Civil Reme-
dies-Implied Cause of Action for Fourth Amendment Violations, 46 TUL. L. REV. 816-22
(1972); Note, Damage Remedy for Federal Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights: Bell v.
Hood, Chapter Two, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 785-90 (1971); Note, The Truly Constitutional Tort,
33 U. PITT. L. REV. 271-85 (1971); Note, Judicial Creation of a Federal Cause of Action for
Damages for Fourth Amendment Violation by Federal Officers. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 686-90;
Note, Constitutional Law: Money Damages for Violations of the Fourth Amendment, 1 I
WASHBURN L.J. 495-98 (1972).
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have applied and, on occasion, extended the holding of Bivens, and third, to
consider which extensions have a legitimate basis in the language of the
Court's opinion and to determine what special advantages arise from basing
a lawsuit on Bivens.
Part I of this article will provide a brief overview of the major decisions
in this area of the law between 1946 and 1971, a detailed chronology of the
Bivens case itself, and, finally, an examination of subsequent Supreme
Court decisions bearing upon this subject. Part II reviews lower federal
court cases that have interpreted Bivens, focusing initially on four procedur-
al topics: the timing of the lawsuit, the jurisdictional amount in controversy
issue, the standards used for judging the sufficiency of the pleadings and,
finally, the availability of injunctive relief in such an action. Part II con-
tinues with an examination of four substantive matters: the applicability of
Bivens to cases other than those involving the Fourth Amendment, the
doctrine of respondent superior in a Bivens-based action, the applicability of
Bivens to cases in which private parties and state officials and institutions
are defendants and, finally, the issues of immunity and good faith in the
context of a Bivens suit. Part I will present the author's conception of
possible future directions for a Bivens-based cause of action, with particular
emphasis upon its use as a potential substitute for suits brought under
selected provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
I. The Bivens Case: A Chronology
A. Prior Decisional Law
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on the proposition that
because the king can do no wrong, he necessarily cannot be sued in his own
courts. 3 Because of this common law doctrine, it has long been a rule of
American law that no suit may be prosecuted against the government
without its consent. 4 Such consent was established with respect to general
liability for negligent tortious conduct on the part of governmental agents by
the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 But a specific provision of
this legislation stipulates that the federal government is not vicariously
responsible for the intentional torts of its personnel.6 As a matter of common
law, certain classes of governmental agents have traditionally been immune
3. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 458-59 (5th ed. 1942); Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 35 (1926).
4. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 207 (1882); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1970).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975). Under these 1974 amendments, a suit may be
brought against the United States for acts of assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, and similar wrongs by federal investigative agents. A federal investigative agent is "any
officer of the United States who is empowererd by law to execute searches, to seize evidence,
or to make arrests for violations of Federal law."
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from prosecution for acts within the scope of their duties;7 in addition, the
Supreme Court has firmly established the principle that a subordinate ad-
ministrative officer is similarly privileged for those torts committed in the
course of discretionary acts (i.e., those requiring the exercise of personal,
independent judgment), but not for those committed in the course of
ministerial acts (i.e., those entailing mere obedience to mandatory orders
issued by another.)' Thus, prior to 1971, a federal official who abused his
power could be sued for damages primarily under state law, but federal law
would supply any immunity he could claim.9 In the period between 1946
and 1970, the Supreme Court handed down two significant decisions regard-
ing the availability of a constitutional cause of action against governmental
officials who commit intentional torts. It is useful to consider these deci-
sions because they accentuate the significance of the Court's holding in
Bivens.
The first of these decisions was Bell v. Hood. 10 In that case a member
of the "Universal Mankind" organization alleged that FBI agents had
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. He lodged a suit
for damages in federal district court, contending that the requisite juris-
diction existed because his claim arose under the Constitution and because
the necessary amount in controversy had been alleged.11 The district court
dismissed the complaint and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding lack of jurisdiction. 12 In the United States
Supreme Court, the respondents argued that the petitioner's claim should be
dismissed, both because it was cognizable only under state law13 and
because the Fourth and Fifth Amendments did not provide for monetary
relief.
14
In his majority opinion, Justice Black simply held that a federal court
must entertain a claim such as the petitioner's unless that claim is either
made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or is manifestly
frivolous.15 Thus the issue decided was a very narrow one; the court merely
indicated that the federal courts had jurisdiction to ascertain whether or not a
complaint such as the petitioner's stated a proper cause of action. 16 On the
7. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1895) (cabinet officers); Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (federal judge); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d
Cir. 1926) (assistant U.S. attorney).
8. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). Cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99
(1895); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-20 (1882); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
170, 179 (1804). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 987-92 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Slocum v. Mayberry 15 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 10, 12 (1817), cited in Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
10. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
11. Id. at 680. Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940).
12. Bell v. Hood, 150 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1945).
13. 327 U.S. at 680-81.
14. Id. at 681.
15. Id. at 682-83.
16. This rationale was followed by a number of lower federal courts in varying contexts
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issue of damages, Justice Black stated:
Moreover, when federally protected rights have been invaded, it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is
also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.17
This language could be interpreted as an indication by the majority that
lower federal courts should not be too quick to find no federal remedy in
cases where a constitutional cause of action was alleged. But, on remand,
the district court in Bell proved to be inflexible. The district court noted that
the FBI agents were immune from prosecution because they had acted
within the scope of their authority. 18 That observation should have pre-
cluded any further discussion of the petitioner's claim. But the court went on
to hold that neither the Fourth and Fifth Amendments nor existing federal
statutes create any cause of action for damages against federal officers, and
that the mere assertion of such a remedy does not mean that it exists in
fact. 19 The complaint was therefore dismissed. The district court's approach
was copied approvingly by other lower federal courts during the succeeding
two decades.
20
The other major case decided by the Supreme Court in this area prior to
1971 was Wheeldin v. Wheeler.21 In that case, petitioner Dawson had been
subpoenaed to appear and testify before the House Un-American Activities
Committee. He alleged that Wheeler, an investigator for the committee, had
affixed Dawson's name to the subpoena without authorization and with
intent to expose the latter to "public shame, disgrace, ridicule, stigma,
scorn and obloquy, and falsely place upon him the stain of disloyalty
during succeeding years. See, e.g., Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 7 (3rd Cir.
1964) (alleged breach of third-party beneficiary contract); Mainelli v. Providence Journal Co.,
312 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1962) (alleged libel); Hicks v. City of Los Angeles, 240 F.2d 495,497 (9th
Cir. 1957) (alleged wrongful discharge from employment); Lowe v. Manhattan Beach School
Dist., 222 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1955) (alleged trespass and conversion); Fielding v. Allen, 181
F.2d 163, 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950) (alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty); Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d
1289 (2d Cir. 1970) (alleged harassment by state authorities seeking to deter the continued
operation of purportedly pornographic bookstores); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 236
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (alleged mismanagement of a mutual fund).
17. 327 U.S. at 684 (footnotes omitted).
18. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 817 (C.D. Cal. 1947) (citing Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 87, 98 (1845)).
19. 71 F. Supp. at 817, 820.
20. See United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
971 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1957); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Martin v.
Wyzanski, 262 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D. Mass. 1967); Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656
(S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582, 586
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961).
21. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
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without any opportunity of fair defense, to petitioner's irreparable injury. "22
Dawson sued in district court, claiming federal question jurisdiction.23 Both
injunctive and monetary relief were sought, but the district court denied the
former because there was no imminent danger that Dawson would be forced
to testify, and it declined to grant the latter because no federal cause of
action for damages was deemed to exist in a case of this sort.24 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing Bell v.
Hood.25 The district court then dismissed the complaint without opinion and
the court of appeals affirmed, finding Wheeler had acted within the scope of
his authority.26
In the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas' majority opinion held that,
although federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain Dawson's complaint,
that complaint evinced no cause of action. 27 The opinion noted that "[a]part
from any rights which may arise under the Fourth Amendment, Congress
has not created a cause of action for abuse of the subpoena power by a
federal official, at least where the subpoena power was never given coercive
effect." ' 28 Dawson was thus left with his remedies at state law. 29 Despite
Justice Douglas' caveats about "rights under the Fourth Amendment" and
"coercive effect," the opinion in Wheeldin and the approach taken by the
district court in Bell offered bleak prospects to any plaintiff seeking to sue
federal officials in federal courts. This fact made the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bivens all the more unexpected.
B. The Bivens Case
1. Lower Court Proceedings
On the morning of November 26, 1965, six federal agents entered the
apartment of Webster Bivens. After conducting a thorough search of the
premises, they arrested and manacled him in front of his wife and children.
The agents accused Bivens of violating narcotics laws and threatened to, but
in fact did not, arrest his entire family. He was then taken to the federal
court building in Brooklyn and later transferred to the Federal Narcotics
22. Id. at 648.
23. Id. Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958). See note 32 infra.
24. 373 U.S. at 648-49.
25. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 280 F.2d 293, 294 (9th Cir. 1960).
26. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 302 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1962).
27. 373 U.S. at 649.
28. Id. at 650.
29. Id. at 652. But Justice Brennan, in a forceful dissent, adopted a contrary stance. He
said: "But I . . . would recognize the existence of federal common-law rights of action
'wherever necessary or appropriate' for dealing with 'essentially federal matters.' Plainly, this
test supports recognition of a federal cause of action on the facts of the instant complaint. ...
[Where, as here, it is alleged that a federal officer acting under color of federal law has so
abused his federal powers as to cause unjustifiable injury to a private person, I see no warrant
for concluding that state law must be looked to as the sole basis for liability." Id. at 664
(Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Black, J., dissenting).
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Bureau. At the latter facility, Bivens was interrogated, photographed, strip-
searched, and booked. The complaint against him was subsequently
dropped by the United States Commissioner. 30 On July 7, 1967, Bivens
brought suit in federal district court, alleging a cause of action under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act3l and jurisdiction under sections 1331(a),32
1343(3), 33 and 1343(4)31 of title twenty-eight of the United States Code. 35
He alleged that both the search of his apartment and his arrest were made
without a warrant and in return sought $15,000 in damages from each
agent. 36 The district court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction
on October 9th and issued a memorandum and order stating its reasons for
dismissal on November 24th.37 The court found no cause of action under
section 1983 because the agents had not acted under color of state law. 38 As
for section 1331(a) jurisdiction, the court responded with a lengthy excerpt
from the opinion of the district court in Bell v. Hood39 and concluded that
"[it] is abundantly clear that no federal question is presented by the com-
plaint.' 40
Bivens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. On April 10, 1969, that court affirmed the district court's decision.
30. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969). Presumably the agents had been mistaken as to Bivens' identity.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects. . . any citizen of the United
States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1957) gives the district courts original jurisdiction of any civil suit
commenced "Etlo redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1957) gives original jurisdiction of an action commenced '[t]o
recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for
the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
35. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp.
12, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 13-14. Section 1343 jurisdiction was found to be dependent on the existence of
civil rights authorized by law and the court therefore found it necessary to look elsewhere for
the existence of a basis for redress. Id. at 13 (citing Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961)).
39. 71 F. Supp. 813, 816-20 (C.D. Cal. 1947), quoted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. at 15. See notes 18-19 and accompanying
text supra.
40. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp.
at 16.
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In his majority opinion, Chief Judge Lumbard declared "that the Fourth
Amendment does not provide a basis for a federal cause of action for
damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.'"41 Although he
did not find the opinion of the district court in Bell to be a conclusive basis
on which to deny Bivens' claim, 42 Chief Judge Lumbard found that all
germane precedents indicated that the petitioner's sole remedy was a cause
of action for trespass in the state court. 43 Bivens' cotinsel had argued that a
federal common law action could be implied from the condemnation of
conduct contained in the Fourth Amendment in the same way that the
federal courts had previously derived such causes of action from statutory
proscriptions. The majority opinion agreed and cited some examples, in-
cluding injunctive relief against continuing constitutional violations and the
exclusionary rule.44 But Chief Judge Lumbard declared:
We do not believe that the remedy of a civil damage action against
law enforcement officials also can be said to be implicit in the
Fourth Amendment on the ground that it is essential to the effec-
tive vindication of the right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizures. In general, damage actions against individual officials
for past constitutional violations would appear to be much less
essential to the maintenance of the rule of law than are remedies to
prevent threatened or continuing constitutional transgressions by
the government itself, or to prevent the government from bene-
fiting from a constitutional violation. 45
Thus the appellate court left Bivens with two options: to sue in the state
court for a "deliberate, and not a merely technical," violation of the Fourth
41. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718,
719 (2d Cir. 1969). In his concurrence, Judge Waterman indicated that he agreed with this
holding as an accurate statement of the law at that point in time; moreover, he believed that the
crucial factor was that a suit would lie somewhere. Id. at 726 (Waterman, J., concurring). Since
the majority found that Bivens' complaint failed to state a cause of action, it expressed no
opinion as to whether or not the respondents were immune from prosecution. Id. at 720.
42. The district court in Bell v. Hood had suggested that the Fourth Amendment pros-
cribed only those unreasonable searches and seizures committed by the federal government,
not those committed by "individual action";.thus an agent exceeding his authority was no
longer serving as an adjunct of the government but rather became a private actor not amenable
to suit under the Constitution. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 817 (C.D. Cal. 1947). Chief Judge
Lumbard found this distinction to be untenable because even though an agent exceeded his
actual authority, he still utilized the "apparent authority" derived from his official position. 409
F.2d at 721. In defense of the district court's rationale in Bell, it should be noted that it relied on
specific language of a prior opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "For more than one
hundred years . . . one of the settled principles of our Constitution has been that [the Fourth
and Fifth] Amendments protect only against invasion of civil liberties by the Government
whose conduct they alone limit." Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487,490 (1944), quoted in
Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. at 816.
43. 409 F.2d at 721 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647,652 (1963); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886)).
44. 409 F.2d at 723-24.
45. Id. at 724.
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Amendment4 6 or to lobby in Congress for the enactment of a new federal
remedy. 47
Neither the opinion of the district court nor that of the appellate court
was surprising. Both were entirely consistent with the precedents set by the
United States Supreme Court in Wheeldin v. Wheeler48 and the district
court in Bell v. Hood.4 9 The Supreme Court granted Bivens' writ of
certiorari. 50 A disinterested observer could not have expected that it would
effect any significant departure from prior decisional law.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
That expectation proved to be incorrect. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals by a six to three majority in an opinion
handed down on June 21, 1971.51 Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority
found that the lower court's conclusion that Bevins' remedy should be
46. Id. at 725.
47. Id. at 724-25.
48. 373 U.S. 647 (1963). See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
50. 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
51. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390 (1971). The majority opinion was authored by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas,
Stewart, White, and Marshall. Justice Harlan concurred specially. Id. at 398-411. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun each wrote separate dissents. Id. at 411-27, 427-30,
430, respectively. Justice Harlan's concurrence raised some valuable points. He conceded that
the interest Bivens claimed was federally protected. Id. at 400. Thus, the primary issue he
confronted was whether or not the creation of a federal common law remedy was a task
relegated exclusively to Congress. He noted that in other contexts, the "Court has authorized
such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy
underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute." Id. at 402. Since the federal courts had
broad equitable powers to enjoin threatened invasions of constitutional interests, it seemed
anomalous to him that congressional authorization would be a prerequisite to the granting of
monetary relief. Id. at 404-05. As for the criteria governing the implementation of such relief,
Justice Harlan said that "[d]amages as a traditional form of compensation for invasion of a
legally protected interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on
future official lawlessness might be thought to result." Id. at 408. Moreover, he indicated that
courts of law are capable of taking into account the relative magnitude of claimed deprivations
of Fourth Amendment rights so as to accord "meaningful compensation." Id. at 409. In a
footnote, Justice Harlan said that the same might not be true with respect to other constitution-
ally protected interests, so the appropriateness of monetary relief in other contexts might vary.
Id. at 409 n.9. Chief Justice Burger's dissent may be summarized by saying that he believed the
creation of a federal damage remedy should be left to Congress. Id. at 411-12. The remainder of
his opinion was a lengthy criticism of the continued existence of the exclusionary rule of
evidence in criminal cases. Id. at 412-27. Justice Black's dissent pointed out that while
Congress had created a cause of action against state officials who violate a person's Fourth
Amendment rights, it had chosen not to enact a remedy against federal officials. Id. at 427-28.
Therefore, for the court to do so was an usurpation of legislative power. Id. at 428. Moreover,
Justice Black argued, the policy considerations involved-overcrowded court dockets, the
potential for frivolous lawsuits, and the possible deterrent effects upon proper official action-
militated against the development of a remedy by judicial fiat. Id. at 428-29. Justice Blackmun's
dissent essentially repeated Justice Black's rationale. Id. at 430.
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limited to a cause of action under state law was based upon an "unduly
restrictive" view of the Fourth Amendment. 52 The majority adopted a more
expansive view of the amendment, saying it "operates as a limitation upon
the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose
jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical
act if engaged in by a private citizen."
53
The Court found it important that alternative remedies at state law were
inadequate. Thus it noted that (1) local trespass laws usually require forcible
entry, whereas in cases involving federal agents, mere invocation of authori-
ty may, in and of itself, secure an entry through either consent or acquiesc-
ence in light of the perils of physical resistance, 54 and (2) state ordinances
could not be expected to limit effectively the exercise of authority by federal
officers. 55 As to the type of federal remedy available, Justice Brennan noted
that damages were traditionally regarded as "the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty." 56 Although the Fourth Amend-
ment does not provide for damage awards, the Court cited Bell for the
proposition that federal courts may utilize any available remedy to rectify an
invasion of a federally protected interest, provided a federal statute creates a
general right to sue. 57 Moreover, Justice Brennan said, "no special factors
counselling hesitation" in the absence of an affirmative congressional au-
thorization, such as federal fiscal policy, existed in this case.5" Wheeldin
was distinguished because the petitioner in that case had sought to "impose
liability upon a congressional employee for actions contrary to no constitu-
tional prohibition, but merely said to be in excess of the authority delegated
to him by the Congress." 59 In sum, the Court announced that a damage
remedy can lie against federal officials who violate a plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights. It then remanded the case for consideration of the issue
of immunity. 6°
At this point, two interrelated interpretative points can be made about
Justice Brennan's opinion. First, the case developed a policy of access. The
underlying thrust of the decision was to afford a plaintiff like Bivens an
opportunity to litigate in federal courts. This was perceived to be necessary
in order both to establish the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment as a
check upon individual abuses of federal authority and to insulate causes of
action based on violations of the Fourth Amendment from the vagaries of
state tort law. In developing this policy of access, the majority opinion
52. Id. at 391.
53. Id. at 392.
54. Id. at 394-95.
55. Id. at 395.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). See note 17 and accompany-
ing text supra.
58. 403 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).
59. Id. at 396-97. See notes 21-22, 28 and accompanying text supra.
60. Id. at 397-98.
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implicitly adopted a rather expansive view of the role of the federal judiciary
vis- -vis that of Congress. As Justice Black contended in his dissent,
creation of a federal remedy was a task best suited for Congress, because
only the legislative branch has both the time and the means to investigate
and fully evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of any particular
method of judicial redress for an official's infringement of a constitutional
right.61 The majority, in the course of its nine-page opinion, did not (and,
realistically, could not) conduct such an evaluation. Second, for a decision
creating an action at federal common law, Bivens is remarkably open-
ended; the Court neither defines the substantive parameters of, nor eluci-
dates the procedural constraints upon, the remedy invented. The lower
federal courts were, in effect, licensed to develop their own rules and a
predictable consequence of this license would be lack of uniformity.
3. The Second Appellate Court Decision
In dealing with the issue of immunity upon remand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit62 took three factors into con-
sideration: the doctrine of immunity for federal officials, 63 the precedents
developed in section 1983 litigation, and common law rules of liability for
police officers. 64 The court held that the federal officers in this case enjoyed
no immunity from prosecution, but were entitled to raise the defense that
they acted "in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the
arrest and search and in the necessity for carrying out the arrest and search in
the way the arrest was made and the search was conducted."
65
With regard to the threshold question of whether the doctrine of
sovereign immunity66 protected the defendants in this suit, Circuit Judge
Medina, in his opinion for the majority, noted that the Supreme Court had
extended such immunity to all officials carrying out "discretionary acts at
those levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the
sound exercise of discretion.'"67 For such an official, immunity from prose-
cution results from any act "within the outer perimeter of his line of
duty.' '68 After reviewing prior definitions of "line of duty" or "scope of
authority,''69 the court concluded that the defendants were acting in their
61. See note 51 supra.
62. For an especially detailed analysis of this decision, see Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents: A New Direction in Federal Police Immunity, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (1973).
63. See notes 3-8 and accompanying text supra.
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
65. Id.
66. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
67. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959), quoted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d at 1342-43.
68. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. at 575, quoted in Bivens v.Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d at 1343.
69. 456 F.2d at 1343-45 (citing, inter alia, Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)
("action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to [an
[Vol. 4
roles as government officers charged with making arrests and hence that
their conduct fell within the bounds of their allotted power. 0 Although the
court granted that the agents were empowered to act as they had, it found
that because their duties were not discretionary in nature, they were not
shielded from prosecution. Judge Medina concluded that immunity was not
warranted either under the common law or under established precedent in
section 1983 actions. 71 Since the court believed that the cause of action
created by the Supreme Court was "roughly analogous" to a section 1983
action against a state official, it was deemed absurd to allow immunity for
one set of police officials and deny it to others, merely because they served
different employers.
72
Having ruled out immunity for the narcotics agents, Judge Medina
noted that even the Second Restatement of Torts allowed a defense of good
faith and reasonable belief in the validity of an arrest and search. 73 In
applying this doctrine to the case at bar, he held:
Therefore, to prevail the police officer need not allege and prove
probable cause in the constitutional sense. The standard governing
police conduct is composed of two elements, the first is subjective
and the second is objective. Thus the officer must allege and prove
not only that he believed, in good faith, that his conduct was
lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable. And so we hold it is
a defense to allege and prove good faith and reasonable belief in the
validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity for carrying
out the arrest and search in the way the arrest was made and the
search was conducted. We think, as a matter of common sense, a
law enforcement officer is entitled to this protection.
74
official's] control or supervision."); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1964)
(same formulation as Spalding but noted that if an act is within an official's line of duty, the
presence of underlying malice is immaterial); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) ("the occasion must be such as would have justified the
[official's] act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was
vested in him.")).
70. In reaching such a conclusion the court expressly declined to hold that the mere
allegation of lack of probable cause for the search and arrest was sufficient to charge the
defendants with the commissions of unauthorized acts. See 456 F.2d at 1344.
71. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the common
law denial of immunity to police officers was applicable in section 1983 suits. See Note,
Immunity of Prosecuting Officials From Suit for Alleged Deprivation of Civil Rights, 40 TEMP.
L.Q. 244, 250 (1967).
72. 456 F.2d at 1346-47 (citing Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Nichols, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418 (1973); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1166 (3d Cir. 1971) (Gibbons, J., for the court),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 205 (5th Cir. 1971) (Bell,
J., concurring)).
73. 456 F.2d at 1347 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121(b) (1965)).
74. 456 F.2d at 1348-49. Chief Judge Lumbard, in his concurrence, suggested that the
standard of probable cause should not be governed by constitutional criteria in Bivens actions,
but rather by the "less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort action against government
agents." Id.
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Clearly, this is a process that balances individual civil rights against the need
for the efficient operation of government; the fact that the defendants were
law enforcement officers weighed heavily in that balance. 75 The case was
then remanded for further proceedings consistent with the balancing princi-
ple announced by the majority.76 On reflection, the Second Circuit's ruling
can be said to have raised serious obstacles to successful litigation of a cause
of action in federal court. But, as the court noted, these obstacles were also
present for similar types of actions brought either under federal or state law
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens.
This second decision by the appellate court was handed down on March
8, 1972. Thus, six years and four months after the incident in question and
four years and nine months after first instituting his action in federal court,
Webster Bivens had earned the right to proceed to trial. In light of the many
obstacles that Bivens had been compelled to overcome in order to acquire
the right to have his claim litigated, one might legitimately wonder why
anyone would wish to follow in his footsteps. That is a question that the
remainder of this article will explore.
C. Subsequent Substantive Supreme Court Discussions
In the years since 1971, the Supreme Court has adopted what could be
characterized as a laissez-faire stance toward its ruling in Bivens. Given the
fact that the Court's opinion in that case was so open-ended, one might
expect that fuller explication would soon be forthcoming. It was not. In later
decisions, it has been suggested that the doctrine of Bivens should apply to
cases involving impairment of the right to have one's votes for party
convention delegates counted, 77 and to alleged Fourth Amendment viola-
tions by IRS officials. 78 But in each instance, these views were expressed by
one or two justices in the course of a sharply-worded dissent. The majority
opinions in each case simply failed to address the subject.
Only two majority opinions construing (or deemed to be construing)
the doctrine of Bivens have been handed down by the Court since 1971. In
the first, District of Columbia v. Carter, 79 the Court held that the conduct of
a police officer employed by the District of Columbia is not actionable under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act because the district is not a state or
75. The majority stressed factors peculiar to the situation of law enforcement officers: (a)
the fact that their lives are constantly in danger (id. at 1347); (b) the fact that they perform
"functions indispensable to the preservation of our American way of life" (id.); (c) the fact that
statutory language regulated the conduct of the agents in this case (id.), and (d) the fact that the
constitutional probable cause standard that such officials must base their reasonable belief
upon is something even "learned and experienced jurists" can't reach any lasting consensus
about (id. at 1348).
76. Id. at 1348.
77. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 14 n.7 (1972) (Marshall & Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
78. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 209-10 n.14 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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territory. s0 But the majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, noted
that such allegedly unconstitutional acts might be reached by a Bivens-based
action.81
The second case was City of Kenosha v. Bruno.82 The appellees
therein were owners of liquor-serving establishments and holders of one-
year liquor licenses issued by the cities of Racine and Kenosha, Wisconsin.
Renewals of the licenses were denied by the cities pursuant to state statutory
procedure.8 3 A suit was lodged in a three judge district court by the
appellees, who alleged that'section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act entitled
them to injunctive relief against the municipalities in question. It was further
alleged that the licenses were denied without a trial-type adversary hearing
because the establishments in question offered nude dancing as enter-
tainment for their customers. 84 The district court held that the failure to
provide an adversary hearing deprived the licenseholders of a property
interest without due process of law required.by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution,8 5 and granted them summary judgment. 86 On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that a municipality is not a person for the purposes
either of a damage suit or an action seeking an injunction under section
1983.87 It went on to note that during the proceedings in the three judge
district court, each of the appellees had alleged an investment of at least
$20,000 in their respective businesses.88 The Court suggested that if this
were true there might be a sufficient amount in controversy to warrant the
district court's assumption of jurisdiction under section 1331(a) of title
twenty-eight of the United States Code. 89 As the case had been decided
below on cross-motions for summary judgment and the appellate record was
therefore correspondingly incomplete, the majority declined to address the
issue and simply remanded the case for further proceedings. 90 The Court
never cited Bivens, but merely referred to section 1331. Two concurring
justices specifically stated, however, that the remedy created in Bivens was
available to the appellees in this case.
91
What can properly be adduced from Bruno? To infer a conclusion one
way or the other from a clear-cut refusal to decide is unwise. As one district
80. Id. at 432. See note 31 supra.
81. Id. at 433.
82. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
83. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.05(1), (8) (Supp. 1973).
84. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43, 45 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id. at 51.
87. 412 U.S. at 513. See note 31 supra. Accord, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
88. 412 U.S. at 514.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958). See note 32 supra.
90. 412 U.S. at 514.
91. Id. at 516 (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., concurring).
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court has said, the Supreme Court, after noting possible section 1331(a)
jurisdiction, simply remanded the case "without in any way intimating what
the appropriate disposition should be." 92 Yet some other federal courts have
concluded that Bruno permits the lodging of a Bivens-based action against a
municipality. 93 Even if one assumes that the Supreme Court authorized
section 1331(a) as the jurisdictional basis for such a claim, there is no
indication that the majority had a cause of action based on Bivens in mind
when it referred to section 1331; it might well have been referring to the
possibility of injunctive relief against a municipality or state subdivision that
deprives a plaintiff of constitutional rights that existed long before Bivens
was decided. 94 If the Supreme Court intended to permit the appellees in
Bruno to sue under the doctrine of Bivens, the consequences which flow
from this proposition are significant. It would mean that Bivens itself
applies to actions for injunctive as well as monetary relief, that it remedies
violations of the Fourteenth as well as the Fourth Amendment, that it lies
against state as well as federal officers, and that it may be utilized to redress
deprivations of property interests as well as liberty interests. Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall would appear to be willing to accept these consequences,
but there is no conclusive indication that at least three of their fellow justices
are willing to join them. Thus, with respect to discussions about and analysis
of Bivens by the Supreme Court, the scope of the remedy remains as
nebulous today as it was in 1971. The onus of interpretation and expansion
has shifted by default to the lower federal courts.
IV. Subsequent Interpretations by the Lower Federal Courts
A. Selected Procedural Problems
This section of the article focuses on the development of Bivens by
lower federal courts. Emphasis will first be placed on four procedural topics
92. Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (footnote omitted).
93. See, e.g., Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1303 (D.D.C. 1976); Williams v.
Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155,156 (N.D. 11. 1975); Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 323,325 (N.D. Ohio
1975); Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto,
372 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
94. See, e.g., Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233,237 (1920); City of Mitchell v. Dakota
Cent. Tel. Co., 246 U.S. 396, 407 (1918); Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135,
155 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 164 (1910); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 220 (1897); City Ry. Co. v. Citizens
R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 557, 570 (1896); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 112 (1896); In re Tyler, 149
U.S. 164, 190 (1893); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 203, 220-21 (1872). See also City of Charlotte v. Fire Fighters Local 660, 426 U.S.
283, 284 n.l (1976). There the Court stated that it did not need to decide (in the context of the
case that it was dealing with) whether a suit against a municipality could be jurisdictionally
grounded on section 1331(a). This statement was followed by citations to Bivens and Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). At least one possible interpretation of this enigmatic comment is
that Bruno did not decide whether a Bivens-based cause of action may be brought against a
municipality which infringes a plaintiff's constitutional rights.
(statute of limitations, amount in controversy, standards for judging the
sufficiency of the pleadings, and injunctive relief), and then on four substan-
tive subjects (applications of Bivens to other amendments, the problem of
respondeat superior, applications of Bivens to -non-federal defendants, and
the problems of immunity and good faith). Two preliminary considerations
should be mentioned. First, the selection of topics is arbitrary. There are
other issues that merit analysis, but those subjects selected are perhaps
the most controversial and problematic. Second, during the course of the
remainder of this article, it will be necessary to discuss how the topics above
have been dealt with in section 1983 cases, when and where courts ren-
dering decisions in Bivens-based suits have deemed such cases to have
precedential value.
95
I. The Timing of the Lawsuit
In the course of its opinion in Bivens, the Court failed to indicate what
statute of limitations would govern the remedy being created. Therefore, on
this subject, the lower federal courts had a tabula rasa with which to work.
They were constrained solely by the limits of their own discretion, but those
limits proved to be very constricting. If the lower federal courts desired an
object lesson in how not to develop a statute of limitations policy, they
needed to look no further than their own record in section 1983 litigation.
Though created by Congress, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act contains
no statute of limitations. 96 It is an established precept of statutory interpreta-
tion that where an act of Congress lacks a statute of limitations governing
the remedy it creates, federal courts should apply the statute of limitations
controlling analogous types of suits in the forum state. 97 Early in this
century that doctrine was extended to Civil Rights Act litigation by the case
of O'Sullivan v. Felix,98 which indicated that although the action is brought
in a federal court, that does "not preclude" application of time limits
imposed by the states.
99
95. At this juncture, it is worth noting that many federal courts have found Bivens to be a
federal analogue of section 1983 and thus have generally applied procedural rules developed in
the latter context to the former type of case. See note 285 and accompanying text infra.
96. See note 31 supra.
97. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947); McClaine v. Rankin,
197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1895); Moviecolor Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961).
98. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
99. Id. at 322. Accord, Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1974);
Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1972); Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313, 315 (7th
Cir. 1971); Romer v. Leary, 425 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1970); Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d
495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967); Horn v. Bailie,
309 F.2d 167, 168 (9th Cir. 1962); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956). When a
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This simple doctrine has led to highly disparate results among the
various courts of appeals. Thus in the Third Circuit, the rule is that the court
will apply the statute of limitations governing the tort underlying the section
1983 complaint. 100 In the Second, 101 Ninth, 102 and Tenth'03 Circuits a two-
step procedure has been developed. The courts initially must apply the time
limitation for state actions created by statute; if no such statute of limitations
exists within the forum state, then the general civil limitations period will
control. The Fourth Circuit purports to apply state statutes of limitations
governing injury to the person,' °4 but it is as yet unclear whether that is a
general rule within the circuit or a rule arising only out of the Virginia legal
system with which the two leading court of appeals opinions dealt. The
Fifth, 105 Sixth, 10 6 and Seventh'07 Circuits have adopted divergent ap-
particular claim accrues (and thus when the statute of limitation begins to run) is still deemed to
be a matter of federal law. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947); Fisher v. Whiton, 317
U.S. 217, 220-21 (1942); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941). But when a statute is tolled is
still apparently a matter of state law. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941-42 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Hughes v. Smith, 264 F. Supp. 767,770 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 389 F.2d 42
(3d Cir. 1967); Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
100. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1972); Orlando v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.,
455 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 858 (1972); Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 227,
229 (3d Cir. 1972); Hileman v. Knable, 391 F.2d 596, 597 (3d Cir. 1968); Henig v. Odorioso, 385
F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1967).
101. Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1974); Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520,
526-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973); Ortiz v. LaVallee, 442 F.2d 912,914 (2d Cir.
1971); Romer v. Leary, 425 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1970); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319
F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1963).,
102. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1969); Horn v. Bailie, 309 F.2d 167, 168
(9th Cir. 1962); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962).
103. Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d
914, 915 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
104. Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615, 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972);
Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1972). In the latter case, the court indicated that
every cause of action under section 1983 results from personal injuries, so perhaps its approach
has ramifications for district courts situated in other states within the Fourth Circuit.
105. See White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82-3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973)
(applied three-year Florida statute of limitations for statutorily-created liability); Nevels v.
Wilson, 423 F.2d 691, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1970) (same conclusion as in White); Shank v. Spruill, 406
F.2d 756, 756-57 (5th Cir. 1969) (applied two-year Georgia general statute of limitations in the
absence of one applicable to the underlying tort); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 689 (5th Cir.
1967) (applied one-year Alabama statute of limitations for the underlying tort).
106. See Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 1972) (applied five-year
Kentucky limitation period for liability created by statute); Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564,
567-68 (6th Cir. 1969) (applied three-year Michigan limitation period for liability due to injuries
to the person or to property); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (applied
two-year Michigan statute of limitations on the cause of action for the underlying tort).
107. See Weber v. Consumers Digest, Inc., 440 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (applied five-
year Illinois statute of limitations for underlying tort); Jones v. Jones, 410 F.2d 365, 366-67 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970) (applied two-year Illinois statute of limitations for
underlying tort); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 63-64 (7th Cir. 1958) (applied Illinois catch-all
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proaches in various cases, sometimes applying the state statute of limitations
governing the underlying tort, and at other times applying the time period
controlling causes created by statute. Again, there appears to be no one
fixed rule in these circuits and it is virtually impossible to guess whether
they tend to favor one approach or another. The Eighth Circuit has adopted
two different rules, 0 8 which it admits are completely inconsistent with one
another. 109
The chaotic statute of limitations policy developed in section 1983
litigation exemplified one unfeasible way of dealing with the problem. The
approach taken in Bivens actions has proved to be even more confusing.
This was graphically illustrated by the results obtained in three cases
decided by different New York federal judges in 1975 and 1976. The first of
these decisions was Felder v. Daley. 110 A suit was brought against state and
federal law enforcement officers alleging a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment arising from an illegal entry into the plaintiffs' apartment. 11 The
incident in question occurred on September 26, 1972; the complaint was
filed on November 27, 1973. The federal officer in the case was not served
until October 2, 1975.112 In analyzing its options, the district court indicated
that it was bound to borrow the analogous statute of the forum state.' 13 The
police officers employed by the state (and sued under section 1983) were
held to be entitled to claim the bar imposed by the three-year limitation
period for liability based on a statute."I4 But the federal officer being sued
under Bivens was not liable under any statute.1 1 5 Therefore, the court held
that the cause of action against him was restricted by the New York one-year
statute of limitations). See also Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941-42 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 894 (1972) (suggested but declined to say whether it might depart from Wakat).
108. See Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1043 (1972) (applied two-year Minnesota statute of limitations for underlying tort); Glass-
coe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 1970) (said either five-year Arkansas general statute
or three-year statute limiting liability derived from statute was applicable).
109. Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1975) (applied 180-day limit
contained in Nebraska fair housing statute); Reed v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1973)
(applied three-year Arkansas general statute). See also Barrett v. Wichael, 387 F. Supp. 1263,
1264 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (elected to follow Glasscoe); Zaun v. Halpern, 382 F. Supp. 2, 3 (D.
Minn. 1974) (elected to follow Savage).
110. 403 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
111. Id. at 1325. It was alleged that the defendants smashed in the door of the apartment
with a sledgehammer, entered with drawn revolvers, ransacked the premises and harassed one
occupant, forcing her to sit naked during the search. Id. at 1326.
112. Id. at 1325.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1326. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214(2) (McKinney 1972).
115. Id. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). There the Court
construed the term "statute" broadly enough so as to encompass a provision of the Constitu-
tion.
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statute of limitations for intentional torts.1"' Thus the claims of the adult
plaintiffs against him were dismissed as time-barred.' 17
The second case was Ervin v. Lanier. "I The plaintiff hijacked a jet
airliner to Cuba in 1969. He thereafter sought political asylum in Czecho-
slovakia. Desiring to renounce his American citizenship, he visited the
United States embassy in Prague for that purpose. The complaint alleged
that he was detained by embassy officials and compelled to sign "voluntary
repatriation" papers. However, he managed to escape from the embassy and
fled to East Germany. He was captured by United States government agents,
allegedly beaten, and once more coerced into signing papers of repatriation.
The plaintiff alleged that defendant Lanier (International Relations Officer
for the Office of Public Safety of the Department of State) conspired with
agents of Pan American Airlines to have the plaintiff taken back to the
United States.' 19 A multimillion-dollar lawsuit was lodged against the vari-
ous government agents and against Pan American Airlines. 120 The acts in
question occurred in September, 1969; a complaint was not filed until
November 27, 1974.121 Regarding the Bivens claim, the district court found
a "judicial preference" for treating federal defendants in Bivens actions and
state defendants in section 1983 actions alike. 122 It therefore held that New
York's three-year limitations period for legislatively-created liability was
"more appropriate even though a Bivens action is not technically based
upon a liability created by statute." ' 123 In any case, plaintiff's claim was
time-barred. 124
The last decision in this series was Regan v. Sullivan.125 There, as in
Felder, it was alleged that state and federal law enforcement officers had
combined to infringe the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. But in Regan
the plaintiffs urged the court to adopt a "purely federal statute of limitations
on grounds of uniformity." 126 They argued that since the 1974 amendments
116. 403 F. Supp. at 1326. See N.Y. Civ. PRic. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
117. Id. The complaints of the infant plaintiffs, though tolled by state law, were summarily
dismissed for failure to prosecute, without any supporting authority.
118. 404 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
119. See id. at 17-18.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id. Jurisdiction was alleged primarily under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. A cause of action
against the airlines was purportedly based on three provisions of the Civil Rights Act, two other
federal statutes, and Bivens. The court never decided whether Bivens applies to a private actor.
See id. at 20. For cases which do address this topic, see notes 290-310 and accompanying text
infra.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. Accord, Feilder v. Moore, 423 F. Supp. 62, 63 (W.D.N.C. 1976); Shifrin v.
Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1301-02 (D.D.C. 1976).
124. 404 F. Supp. at 20.
125. 417 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
126. Id. at 402.
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to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 7 the United States was answerable for the
intentional acts of its investigative agents; thus in a Bivens suit arising out of
those same acts, the statute of limitations should be that imposed by section
2401(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act on a suit against the government. 
128
The court dismissed this argument, saying that that provision referred to the
time for the filing of an administrative claim, not the institution of a
lawsuit. 129 It went on to consider other alternatives. One was the application
of the same statute of limitations utilized in section 1983 suits; the district
court indicated that such a solution would foster only state-by-state uni-
formity.130 The court concluded that it "must reject the argument that a
• . .federal period [of limitations, (referring to section 1983 precedents)]
should be created, and therefore [turned] to New York law as the most
appropriate source to determine the applicable limitations period for a
Bivens action." 131 The result achieved in Ervin v. Lanier was rejected
because a cause of action founded on the Fourth Amendment could not be
said to be derived from statutory law. 132 The result in Felder v. Daley was
objectionable because the "conceptual character and the rights" underlying
a Bivens cause of action were said to differ distinctively from that of an
action for an intentional tort. 33 Noting that the Fourth Amendment limits
official action, the district court in Regan applied the state statute of
limitations arising from liability incurred by an official while performing an
act in his official capacity, which required commencement of a suit within
one year. 134 The reason given was:
Law enforcement officers would be placed at a distinct disadvan-
tage and effective action in making arrests would inevitably be
inhibited if such officers had to wait for two, three or more years to
find out whether or not they would be subject to some large civil
liability at a time when memories were dim and witnesses and
records perhaps not available.
35
Under this approach, the plaintiff's claim was time-barred.
136
127. See note 6 supra.
128. Id. at 402. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970): "A tort claim against the United States shall be
forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two
years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to
which it was presented."
129. 417 F. Supp. at 402.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 403.
133. Id.
134. Id. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 215(1) (McKinney 1972).
135. Id. at 404.
136. Id. In this case, plaintiffs sued fourteen months after the incident in question occured.
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Thus three federal courts situated in the same state purporting to apply the
same general legal principle arrived at three different conclusions. The net
result of this approach to a statute of limitations policy is that the plaintiff
bears the risk of being assigned to a district court unwilling to adopt an
approach favoring his claim. Consequently, the principle of access to the
federal judiciary voiced by the Supreme Court in Bivens is undermined. If
copying the approach utilized in section 1983 cases is undesirable, and if
reliance on analogous state law provisions produces a deleterious inconsist-
ency, what other alternatives exist? One option, of course, is that the
Supreme Court could adopt an arbitrary period of limitation on its own. As
Bivens itself is a judge-made remedy, this is a logical technique that would
result in nationwide uniformity.
A second technique might be application of the concept of laches. As the
Supreme Court has said, "laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of
time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be
enforced-an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or
relations of the property or the parties." 13 7 Thus laches substitutes pragmat-
ic concepts of convenience and fairness to the parties for mechanistic
invocations of time limits. Arguably, this flexible, prudential approach is
well suited for furthering the policy of access espoused in Bivens and at the
same time affording maximum protection for governmental officials con-
fronted with possible liability arising from stale claims. Two objections,
however, may be raised to the alternative of laches. First, the flexibility of
the device is in itself a source of uncertainty. A statute of limitations
provides a clear-cut time span, a specified duration. But the defense of
laches may bar one suit brought within six months and not prohibit another
suit brought only after ten or fifteen years have elapsed. 138 It is an ad hoc
technique, and ad hoc techniques, by definition, produce no clear-cut
standards. A second and more telling objection is the fact that federal courts
will not permit the intrusion of equitable principles into actions at law.
139 If
one characterizes a Bivens action as a suit in equity (and some courts would
permit equitable redress as part of what they denominate a Bivens cause of
137. Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892). See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392, 396 (1946); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Blankenship v. Boyle,
329 F. Supp. 1089, 1112 (D.D.C. 1971).
138. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946); Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448,
461 (1894); McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (I How.) 161, 168 (1843). See also Powell v. Zuckert,
366 F.2d 634, 637 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
139. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-64 (1947); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289
(1940); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 996 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1011 (1970).
Even where a complaint prays in the alternative for legal and equitable relief, it has been held
that laches is unavailable. See Morgan v. Koch, supra; Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th
Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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action), 14° this objection presents no problem. But since the monetary
remedy created by the Supreme Court in Bivens is a distinctly legal remedy,
the objection seems persuasive.
Yet a third option was suggested by one of the plaintiff's arguments in
Regan. As that decision pointed out, 141 since 1974 the United States has
consented to being sued for intentional torts committed by its investigative
agents. Since a Fourth Amendment infringement can now produce both a
suit against the government and a suit against the individual federal officials
involved, it makes sense to impose similar timing constraints. As the district
court in Regan indicated, 142 section 2401(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act
is inapposite. But the same cannot be said for its companion provision,
section 2401(a):
Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right
of action first accrues. The action of any person under legal disabil-
ity or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be
commenced within three years after the disability ceases.
43
It may be argued that six years is too long. But if the government is willing
to make itself amenable to suit for so lengthy a period despite all the policy
considerations that would seem to militate against such an extended limita-
tion period, is there any reason why the time limit should be less for an agent
of the government?' 44 A statute of limitations of six years merely ensures a
full opportunity to lodge a suit in federal court; it does not ensure that the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits of his claim.
2. Amount in Controversy Requirement
It is now firmly established' 45 that jurisdiction for a Bivens suit must be
based on section 1331(a) of title twenty-eight of the United States Code, and
140. See notes 201-03 and accompanying text infra.
141. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 129 and accompanying text supra.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1966). One crucial problem with this proposal is that its underly-
ing rationale applies only in classical Bivens cases involving federal agents. Where the doctrine
of Bivens has been extended to impose liability upon state agents or private parties, the
optimum solution may simply be a single time limit imposed by the Supreme Court.
144. It might be argued that whereas the government can afford a large damage award in
favor of a plaintiff, an individual official cannot. But this objection is one that is really directed
against the creation of any monetary remedy, rather than against a possible period of limitations
governing that remedy. The Supreme Court in Bivens ignored the potential crushing financial
blow an adverse verdict might have upon an official found guilty of tortious conduct; one might
simply suggest that it was not the function of the court to concern itself with the ability of the
named defendants to pay any damage award in case the plaintiff eventually prevailed on the
merits. Moreover, as the Court noted by analogy, a potential plaintiff's chances of eventual
success may be decidedly slim. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391 n.4 (1971).
145. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 546-47 (1972); Nguyen Da
Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F.
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therefore there must be a showing of over $10,000 in controversy. 141 The
rule laid down by the Supreme Court in 1938 is that if a court is convinced
"to a legal certainty" that the necessary amount is not in controversy, it
must reject the plaintiff's claim. 147 The problem is exacerbated when the
plaintiff seeks to redress a deprivation of his constitutional rights. For
example, consider a situation similar to that presented in the Bivens case
itself: federal agents break into the plaintiff's dwelling, damage the prem-
ises and subject the plaintiff to humiliation and abuse. The actual damages
suffered may be minimal, but the infringement of the plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment interest in being free from unreasonable searches and seizures
is considerable. What is the cost in dollars and cents of that infringement,
and what type of valuation is to be placed on the plaintiff's right?
Supp. 1299, 1312-13 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sheets v. Stanley Community School Dist. No. 2, 413 F.
Supp. 350, 351 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1976); Ni\on v. Hampton, 400 F.
Supp. 881, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976); Barszcz v. Board of
Trustees, 400 F. Supp. 675, 676 (N.D. II. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Smith v.
City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
146. See note 32 supra. The obviousness of this proposition was not immediately apparent.
The majority opinion by Justice Brennan in Bivens was silent on the jurisdictional basis of the
remedy created. It was Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, who suggested that the Court was
considering Bivens' claim of jurisdiction under section 1331(a) and not his alternative claims
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Could jurisdiction have been
maintained legitimately under either section 1343(3) or 1343(4)? The Second Circuit in its first
decision in Bivens said no, both because Bivens could neither allege the "color of state law"
which is a prerequisite of section 1343(3) jurisdiction nor the "Act of Congress" which is
necessary for section 1343(4) jurisdiction, and also because section 1343, taken in toto, was
deemed to apply only to state and not to federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 720 n.1 (2d Cir. 1969). Other courts
generally concur with the view of the Second Circuit. See, e.g., King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140,
1151 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F. Supp. 492, 500 (D.R.I. 1976);
Blassingame v. United States Attorney Gen., 387 F. Supp. 418,419 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brown v.
Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 n. 1 (E.D. Va. 1973); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp.
105, 108 (N.D. I11. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 415 U.S. 970 (1974); Shimabuku v. Britton, 357
F. Supp. 825, 826 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974). The one
major exception is the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972), it was said in dictum that an invocation of section 1343(3)
alone plus an averment of a deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights would suffice to state a
cause of action against federal officers. Id. at 274-75. See also Finch v. Weinberger, 407 F.
Supp. 34, 40 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (suggested in dictum that section 1343(3) might be a source of
jurisdiction in a suit against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare). These conten-
tions are both unique and dubious.
147. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). Accord, Bell
v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 243 (1943). This standard is sufficiently elastic
so that it is capable of being manipulated by a judge. Thus in Comprehensive Group Health
Serv. Bd. of Directors v. Temple Univ., 363 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the "legal
certainty" standard was said to require no more than a "present probability" that an amount
exceeding the minimum jurisdictional requirement was at stake. Id. at 1095 n.49.
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The prudential reasons underlying an amount in controversy requirement
were best stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the case of Arnold v. Troccoli: 1
4 8
With mounting caseloads in our metropolitan centers, and increas-
ing numbers of cases awaiting trial, it has become doubly important
that the district courts take measures to discover those suits which
ought never to have been brought in the federal court and to
dismiss them when the court is convinced to a legal certainty that
the plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of $10,000.149
In the past, the Supreme Court has not been indifferent to this rationale. In
other contexts, it has indicated that it may not take cognizance of cases to
which no test of money value can be applied. 150 Should this principle apply
in cases where constitutional violations are alleged? The majority of the
Supreme Court in Bivens never discussed the problem but it would seem
that rigorous application of such a principle would frustrate the very policy
of access to the federal courts which Bivens sought to establish. Justice
Harlan, in his concurrence, indicated that
[T]he experience of judges in dealing with private trespass and
false imprisonment claims supports the conclusion that courts of
law are capable of making the types of judgment concerning causa-
tion and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful com-
pensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these
days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse
door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on
the comparative importance of classes of legally protected inter-
ests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning of the
courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted
to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitu-
tional principles.,
148. 344 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1965).
149. Id. at 845. Accord, Givens v. W. T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612,614 (2d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 56 (1972); Opelika Nursing Home v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 666-67
(5th Cir. 1971); City of Boulder v. Snyder, 396 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1051 (1969); Elfland v. Widman, 284 F. Supp. 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Arnold dealt with
the amount in controversy issue in the context of diversity, not federal question, jurisdiction.
But arguably the underlying policy considerations asserted by the Second Circuit apply with
equal force to suits based on section 1331 (a). During the analysis of the amount in controversy
requirement, there will be numerous references to decisions involving similar claims to those
presented in Bivens-based suits, but decided prior to 1971. The reason for doing so is that the
threshold jurisdictional problems will be the same in all cases involving an issue as to whether
or not there is the mandatory amount in dispute required by section 1331(a).
150. See, e.g., Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498 (1885); Youngstown Bank v. Hughes,
106 U.S. 523, 524 (1882); Potts v. Chumasero, 92 U.S. 358, 361 (1875); Barry v. Mercein, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847). Accord, Carroll v. Somervell, 116 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1941).
151. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
409, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The manner in which the lower federal courts have dealt with the
minimum jurisdictional amount requirement in the context of cases involv-
ing alleged deprivations of constitutional rights has led to diverse results.
Some courts have adopted a restrictive approach and have flatly declined to
entertain suits involving purported infringements of rights incapable of
valuation; this is distinctly a minority view. 15 2 Other courts have rendered
decisions (most of which antedate the Supreme Court's ruling in Bivens)
that require a plaintiff to go beyond merely alleging that the constitutional
right offended was in some sense inestimable; under these rulings, he or she
must allege and show monetary consequences definitely exceeding the
required jurisdictional amount. 153 A third approach has been that of accord-
ing the complaint a "liberal construction" which often results in an ipse
dixit by the court that the jurisdictional obstacle has in fact been over-
come. 154 Yet other courts purport to apply the "legal certainty" test, and
thus conclude that where constitutional rights have been allegedly violated,
it is legally uncertain that the requisite jurisdictional amount is not at
stake. 155 Perhaps the largest number of courts have simply held that the
deprivation of a constitutional right will, if alleged, be enough in and of
itself to surmount the $10,000 barrier; 156 one court has even gone so far as to
152. E.g., Kheel v. Port of New York Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 83 (1972); Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1398 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S.
960 (1970); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 528, 538 (M.D. Tenn.
1973); Calvin v. Conlisk, 367 F. Supp. 476, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd. 520 F.2d 1, 9-10 (7th Cir.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd without considering the point, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
153. E.g., Yoder v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation, 339 F.2d
360, 364 (9th Cir. 1964); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 1001 (1965); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (E.D.N.C. 1972); West End
Neighborhood Corp. v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (D.D.C. 1970). The majority of these
cases antedate Bivens and, in the instance of Giancana, a later decision of the Seventh Circuit
was quick to distinguish it and hence undercut its value as precedent. See Calvin v. Conlisk, 520
F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1975) vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
154. E.g., Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D.R.I. 1972); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade
Comm'n v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 480 F.2d
326 (2d Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974). See also Fein v. Selective Service Sys.
Local Bd. No. 7, 430 F.2d 576, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
155. E.g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 424
U.S. 828 (1976); Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 1063 (D. Md. 1976);
Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1976); Revis v. Laird, 391
F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd without opinion, 541 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1976);
Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Butler v. United States, 365 F.
Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. Hawaii 1973)
156. E.g., Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424
U.S. 902 (1976); CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Schroth v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Hawaii 1973); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp.
797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (26 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
965 (1972); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 695-96 (D.R.I. 1969).
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say that unspecific allegations to this effect will suffice. 157 Other courts have
elected to practice what can only be referred to as creative jurisprudence;
they will, of their own accord, perform the task of searching the facts
alleged in the pleadings in order to infer the existence of the requisite
jurisdictional amount.158 Finally, some courts choose to lump together the
compensatory and punitive damages sought by the plaintiff in a Bivens
action in order to find an amount in excess of $10,000 at stake.159
The more conservative approaches listed in the foregoing paragraph
sacrifice a plaintiff's ease of access to the courts for the presumed benefit of
having a less crowded docket and concomitantly fewer demands on the time
and resources of the judiciary. The more liberal approaches tend to take
Bivens at its word; the courts following such approaches decline to dismiss
complaints solely because of the uncertainty of the extent of damages
incurred. One might well ask whether the minimum amount in controversy
157. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931-32 (10th Cir. 1975).
158. See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971) (in case involving a soldier who sought to prevent his transfer to Vietnam, the court
inferred the requisite amount in controversy by considering the loss of earning capacity which
might be occasioned by a potential battlefield injury); Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363,
1365 n.2 (D.D.C. 1973) (in suit attempting to oust the acting director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, jurisdictional amount inferred, inter alia, from the facts that said director ad-
ministered the disbursement of $790 million dollars annually and earned over $10,000 a year);
Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 920 (8th Cir.
1973) (in suit alleging reservist who failed to have his hair cut short was threatened with
involuntary reactivation, jurisdictional amount inferred from the potential costs of such reacti-
vation).
159. E.g., Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d
1068, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Pirtone v. Mercadante, 420 F.
Supp. 1384, 1387 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 n.l (D.D.C.
1976); Gardels v. Murphy; 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Il. 1974). In contexts other than a
Bivens type of action, this technique has been deemed permissible. See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred
Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886);
Wood v. Stark Tri-County Bldg. Trades Council, 473 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1972); Davis v.
Peerless Ins. Co. 255 F.2d 534,538 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,
659 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). The Second Circuit disapproved such an aggregation of compen-
satory and punitive damages because it found that Bivens purportedly did not allow for punitive
damages. This interpretation was based on the language in Justice Brennan's opinion holding
that Bivens "is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he had suffered as a result of
the agents' violation of the [Fourth] Amendment." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (emphasis added). The issue is not
entirely free of doubt; resolution depends on one's view of the purpose underlying an award of
punitive damages. If that purpose is deterrence of similar conduct by others, then punitive
damages should have no place in a Bivens action because deterrence has no place in such an
action for the purposes of determining liability. See id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring). But there
is significant authority to the effect that punitive damages have a second purpose in that they
compensate the plaintiff for ordinarily non-compensible injuries. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971). Nevertheless, it is the author's opinion that the Second Circuit's
view has merit.
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requirement should apply at all in Bivens actions. A state officer invading a
plaintiff's constitutional rights can be sued for damages in a section 1983
action, 16° yet there is no amount in controversy requirement for such a
suit.1 61 There is no persuasive reason for having suits against federal officers
for similar unconstitutional conduct governed by different prerequisites. If
one assumes that there is no valid reason for making such a distinction, it
then becomes necessary to reconcile that assumption with the ineluctable
conclusion that the only legitimate jurisdictional basis of a Bivens suit is
section 1331(a), with its amount in controversy requirement. Perhaps the
optimum solution is for the federal courts to adopt a uniform policy requir-
ing that (a) the plaintiff in a Bivens suit make only a pro forma allegation
that over $10,000 is at stake, and that (b) such an allegation be deemed
conclusive for jurisdictional purposes, so that the defendant will be pre-
cluded from contesting the issue. If it is truly vital to ensure that a plaintiff is
afforded access to federal court so that he may have an opportunity to
vindicate an invasion of his constitutional rights, then such a concededly
liberal policy would seem to be appropriate. The only major objections to
such an approach are those suggested by Arnold v. Troccoli:162 the
screening-out of frivolous lawsuits and the overcrowding of court dockets.
Frivolous lawsuits may be dealt with by other devices, however. 163 As for
the problem of overcrowding if the jurisdictional policy underlying a Bivens
160. See Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397
F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d
Cir. 1965); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 124 (5th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975
(1964); Hague v. C.I.O., 101 F.2d 774, 789 (3d Cir.), mod. on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919); United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle,
340 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 170 (D.N.J.
1971), aff'd without opinion, 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134,
142-43 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Davis v. Board of Trustees, 270 F. Supp. 528, 531 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd 396 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968); Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D. Idaho
1962); Soloman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 709, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Some
commentators have suggested that the damage remedy in a section 1983 suit is of recent origin.
See REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS at 680 (2d ed. K. York & J. Bauman eds. 1973). The
cases cited above indicate that this is simply not so.
161. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543-44 n.7 (1972); Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161 (1943). The reason for this is that the jurisdictional basis for a
cause of action under section 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3), and that statute contains no minimum
amount in controversy requirement. See note 33 supra.
162. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text supra. In fact, it has been suggested that
because a plaintiff in a federal question case relies on question case relies on rights created by
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, the federal courts have a duty to provide
a forum for his or her claim, regardless of how petty (in a pecuniary sense) that claim might be.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICrION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS § 1311, at 174 (1969).
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (1966) (judgment on the pleadings) and FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b)
(1963) (summary judgment motion brought by a defendant).
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action was harmonized with those of a section 1983 action, Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion in Bivens acknowledged and dismissed that conten-
tion. 164 Surely, a liberal approach to the amount in controversy requirement
is probably preferable to the various inconsistent techniques currently
utilized by lower federal courts.
3. Standards for Judging the Sufficiency of the Pleadings
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a claim for relief must
contain a "short and plain" statement of a basis for jurisdiction, a similar
statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and a demand for
appropriate relief. 165 The Supreme Court, in discussing the standards for
judging the sufficiency of a complaint, has said that it "should not be
dismissed for failure to'state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."1 66 A claim may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) if it is obviously without merit or wholly frivolous.
67
These are the standards generally governing a Bivens type of action; it is
interesting to examine how they operate in practice.
In Rende v. Rizzo,168 a Bivens suit was brought against the mayor and
police commissioner of Philadelphia along with various named and un-
named lower-ranking police officers, alleging various acts of official brutal-
ity resulting in deprivations of constitutional rights. The claim was upheld as
to the unnamed police officers because the alleged violations of civil rights
that they had committed had been specifically pled. 16 9 But the complaints
against the mayor and the commissioner were dismissed. The court held that
allegations that a superior has knowledge of violent propensities on the part
of those under his control and that he was capable of restraining those
164. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
391 n.4 (1971). Justice Brennan cited a study which indicated that of all the reported section
1983 cases instituted in federal courts between 1951 and 1967, only fifty-three survived a motion
to dismiss. See Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litgation-Plaintiff's Remedies, 15 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 555, 580-90 (1968).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1966).
166. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
167. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1974). Previous Supreme Court decisions
have described criteria for dismissal in similar ways. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33
(1962) ("wholly unsubstantial"); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933)
("plainly unsubstantial"); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910) ("obvi-
ously frivolous"); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80 (1909) ("no longer open to discussion");
Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904) ("so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit"). These formulations were developed in the
context of 12(b)(l) dismissals.,
168. 418 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
169. Id. at 97-98.
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propensities would suffice to impose liability on such an upper echelon
officer; but in the case at bar it was alleged only that the officials in question
"encouraged" police brutality by publicizing their "get tough" stance on
crime control.
170
In Nickerson v. Gilbert,171 IRS agents were alleged to have wrongfully
levied upon and sold the plaintiff's property to pay for back taxes. The
defendants claimed they were immune from suit since they were acting
within the outer perimeter of their line of duty.172 The district court agreed
and noted that the determination of whether to execute a levy was a
discretionary act. 173 But the acts complained of were those performed in
connection with the execution of a levy, and hence were ministerial; 174
therefore "[t]o the extent that the plaintiff may be able to establish that the
defendants' conduct in executing said levy was unjustifiably tortious and/or
violative of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants are not
entitled to an absolute immunity from suit."1 75 If unjustifiability was estab-
lished, then the defendants' "good faith or reasonable belief" would be at
issue. 176 The court explained its liberal construction of the complaint by
saying that "the fact that the defendants may have properly seized said
jointly held realty [does not mean] that the entirety of plaintiff's claim must
fail under any and all circumstances . . .; it is possible that specific facts
established during the trial of this action may sustain the plaintiff's al-
legation. '17
7
In White v. Boyle ,178 plaintiff, president of the Virginia Taxpayers'
Association, alleged that because of his criticisms of the present federal
revenue-collecting system, he was made a target of a deliberate policy of
harassment by the IRS, which purportedly took the form of trespasses and
illegal investigations into his bank accounts. 179 The defendants contended
that the investigations were the routine consequence of plaintiff's filing of a
deficient 1040 form for the taxable year of 1972.180 Summary judgment for
170. Id. at 98.
171. 66 F.R.D. 593 (D.R.I. 1975).
172. Id. at 595.
173. Id. at 596.
174. For definitions of the terms "discretionary" and "ministerial," see note 8 and accom-
panying text supra.
175. 66 F.R.D. at 596. The court here purports to follow the ruling laid down in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), but
its approach differs radically from that utilized by the Second Circuit. See notes 67-71 and
accompanying text supra.
176. 66 F.R.D. at 596-97.
177. Id. at 597 (citations omitted).
178. 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'g 390 F. Supp. 514 (W.D. Va. 1975).
179. 538 F.2d at 1078.
180. Id. at 1078-79.
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the defendants was upheld on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to
allege any facts which would put into dispute the motivation underlying the
IRS action 81 and that he had failed to demonstrate any violations of
constitutional rights, because the alleged Fourth Amendment violations
were said to be based entirely on conjecture and hence could not withstand a
specific denial of wrongdoing by the agents in question.182
In Walker v. McCune,183 the plaintiff, an inmate at the Federal Refor-
matory in Petersburg, Virginia, sued the warden and several guards alleging
he was: attacked by fellow inmates on September 12, 1972, after which he
was placed in solitary confinement for six days; nearly burned to death in a
fire -started outside his cell by other inmates on September 18, 1972, and
sexually assaulted by three fellow prisoners on October 29, 1972, where-
upon he was placed in a holding cell for his own protection. 184 Summary
judgment for the defendants was granted because the court said the plaintiff
made no allegations tending to establish either a "pattern of undisputed and
unchecked violence within the institution in general"' 185 or "egregious
failure" by officials to protect him.'
86
These cases reveal certain judicial tendencies in dealing with a Bivens-
based cause of action. First, the flexible nature of such an action will not
displace the rules of civil procedure governing a defendant's motion for a
summary judgment. If a plaintiff attempt§ to resist such a motion solely on
the basis of his allegations, a court is likely to accept as conclusive the
affidavits of the defendant officials, as it did in White. Second, though there
is authority to the contrary, 8 7 allegations must specify which constitutional
rights were impaired by which acts of the defendants. Failure to do so
defeated such claims in Rende and White. Finally, even within these
procedural constraints, there is a great deal of discretion left to courts, as is
shown by the different fates of the complaints in Nickerson and Walker.
Yet if one characterizes Bivens as defining a rule of expedited access to the
federal courts, the result in Nickerson rather than the result in Walker
would seem to be more faithful to the spirit of the Suprime Court's decision.
The problem underlying the issue of standards for judging the suffi-
ciency of a complaint is accentuated when it is considered in the context of
some specialized federal procedure. A useful example of such a procedure is
181. Id. at 1079-80.
182. Id. at 1080. Accord, Smallwood v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 398, 408 (E.D. Mo.
1973).
183. 363 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Va. 1973).
184. Id. at 255-56.
185. 1d. at 256.
186. Id. The authority cited for this two-part test was Penn v. bliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292,
1294 (E.D. Va. 1972).
187. See note 157 supra.
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section 1915 of title twenty-eight of the United States Code.188 Subsection
(a) of that provision authorizes the commencement of a suit in forma
pauperis without either the prepayment of costs or the imposition of a bond
provided the plaintiff submits an affidavit "stating that he is unable to pay,
sets forth his alleged cause of action, and indicates his belief that he is
entitled to redress. 189 Subsection (d) permits the court to dismiss such a
proceeding if the allegation of poverty proves to be false or if it is satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious. 190 In Jones v. Bales,191 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy among a private citizen, state law
enforcement officers, and federal officials to entrap him. In his complaint,
Jones contended that upon being released from prison for a prior offense, he
was arrested on an illegal detainer warrant, incarcerated, and abused. The
defendants then allegedly caused Jones to be released on bail into their
custody; they purportedly imprisoned him in an apartment in Atlanta,
Georgia. He was supplied with false identification papers and claimed he
was coerced into cashing stolen money orders for the defendants. Police
apprehended him with some of these money orders on his person; he was
ultimately convicted for this offense. Jones alleged that the defendants
informed the police that he would have the money orders in question in his
possession on the day of his arrest. 192 The district court said that even a
conclusory complaint would be liberally construed in order to be'filed in
forma pauperis, but, once filed, the court is entitled to use its discretionary
powers under section 1915(d) to dismiss it. 193 Subsection (d) was deemed to
be a very broad "grant of power to dismiss in situations where dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 might be improper." 194 A dismiss-
al in this case was said to be warranted for three reasons. The court did not
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1959).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1970).
191. 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
192. 58 F.R.D. at 456-57.
193. Id. at 464.
194. Id. at 463. The court listed various cases which purportedly support its assertion. Only
two of the cited authorities are directly on point. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 328 (1971)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fletcher v. Young, 222 F.2d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1955). Other courts
have found judicial discretion under section 1915(d) to depend upon the frivolousness of a claim
and they offer differing views of what is or is not frivolous. See Flowers v. Turbine Support
Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975) (wide discretion to dismiss frivolous suits does not
permit highly arbitrary action); Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(power to dismiss a claim where the realistic chances of the plaintiff's success are slight);
Louisiana ex reL Purkey v. Ciolino, 393 F. Supp. 102, 106 (E.D. La. 1975) (same formulation as
in Clark); Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638, 641 (M.D. Mich. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 211 (6th
Cir. 1959) (dismissal permissible when it would be a "miscarriage of justice" to put the
proposed defendants to the burden of retaining counsel and mounting a defense). Thus the
ambit of judicial discretion under section 1915(d) is not settled law by any means.
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believe the plaintiff could prove that a conspiracy existed. 95 Even if he
could, it doubted that he could prove that a conspiracy to deny him his civil
rights existed; 196 in addition, the court said that the plaintiff was prone to sue
at the slightest provocation. 197
How much special discretion to dismiss should be permitted in an in
forma pauperis proceeding? Again, the problem reduces itself to one of ease
of access. Both the in forma pauperis proceeding and the Bivens cause of
action are intended to ensure an opportunity to litigate in federal court. But
in Jones, the discretion inherent in the subsection (d) power to dismiss was
used to cut off the substantive cause of action. Although it is impossible to
say how many Bivens suits are lodged in forma pauperis, 198 it does seem
anomalous to permit differing standards for judging the sufficiency of such a
complaint under rule 12(b) as compared to the similar process under section
1915(d) and to justify such differing standards on the basis of the plaintiff's
financial status. This would seem to be especially true in suits seeking
redress of deprivations of constitutional rights; as Bell v. Hood'99 pointed
out, the discretion to dismiss a complaint in such cases for improper
pleading should be very limited. 2°° This is one area where the Supreme
Court needs to delineate adequate guidelines.
4. Injunctive Relief
The Supreme Court in Bivens specifically created a monetary and
hence a legal remedy. 20' It did not need to create a form of injunctive, and
therefore equitable, redress because such a means of vindicating one's
constitutional rights was already well established before Bivens was de-
195. 58 F.R.D. at 465.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 465 n.4.
198. It should be noted that Webster Bivens sought to appeal from the district court
decision against him in forma pauperis, but the court denied that request, deeming it frivolous
and in bad faith. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276
F. Supp. 12, 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on this point, 409 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969). The
procedure would seem to be most attractive to plaintiffs in the situation of the inmate-
petitioners in Jones and Walker. It should be noted that in Walker, for example, the plaintiff
made an appearance pro se. The advantage in this latter procedure is that a pro se complaint
may be found to state a cause of action under Bivens, provided it meets minimum specifications
as to the necessary pleadings. See, e.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir.
1976); Jones v. Perrigan, 459 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1972); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1165
(3rd Cir. 1971); Jihaad v. Carlson 410 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (E.D. Mich. 1976). However, the
disposition of the complaint in Walker suggests that treatment of pro se petitions is also
somewhat varied.
199. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
200. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
201. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
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cided.20 2 Nevertheless, a few courts have erroneously concluded that Bivens
provides for equitable remedies against officials acting unconstitutional-
ly.2
03
It may be important to determine where the source of the equitable
relief lies for several reasons. First, if the damage remedy of Bivens is
separate from any available injunctive relief, then that damage remedy may
undermine the availability of injunctive relief because it provides adequate
redress at law. 204 If, however, equitable as well as legal remedies can be
derived from Bivens, then it would seem logical to conclude that the
Supreme Court meant them to complement, not cancel, one another. Sec-
ond, the cases granting injunctions against federal officers which were
decided prior to Bivens all hold that such equitable redress is available to a
plaintiff only upon a showing that the officer in question acted either in
excess of the lawful authority granted to him or pursuant to authority
unlawfully conferred upon him. 205 Bivens (as construed by the Second
Circuit) provided for a damage remedy against federal officials performing
nondiscretionary acts without good faith but within the scope of their author-
ity. 2°6 If the source of the equitable relief available to a plaintiff is Bivens
itself, that fact may provide a broader scope for such relief than was
established by the Supreme Court's pre-Bivens rulings. Finally, there is
authority to the effect that immunity is not a bar and good faith is not a
defense to suits seeking injunctions. 07 Implicit in this conclusion is the
unstated premise that such protective devices are available only when the
202. See id. at 400, 404 (Harlan, J., concurring); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946);
Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
203. See Washington Free Comm., Inc. v. Wilson, 484 F.2d 1078, 1081 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(misconstruing Brown v. Donielson, 334 F. Supp. 294, 298 (S.D. Iowa 1971)); Clark v. Illinois,
415 F. Supp. 149, 151 (N.D. III. 1976) (misconstruing Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 157-
58 (N.D. Il. 1975)); Coomes v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 975,983 (D.S.D. 1976); Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. Int'l U. of Op. Eng'rs Local No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268,286 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Other courts permit injunctive requests in a Bivens type of action without analysis. See, e.g.,
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 928, 930 (10th Cir. 1975). Others look to
Bivens for guidelines on when to grant separate injunctive relief. See, e.g., Wounded Knee
Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974).
204. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (citing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,486
(1903), Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 33 (1850)).
205. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949); Years-
ley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S.
605, 619-20 (1912); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-10
(1902); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1893); Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1884).
206. See notes 64-74 and accompanying text supra.
207. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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person being sued faces potential monetary loss as a result of the suit. But
the Supreme Court has been willing to award attorney's fees and court costs
to a successful plaintiff in an action in equity,208 and at least one court has
extended this approach to an equitable proceeding against federal officers to
redress alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.209 If such equitable
relief has its source in Bivens, then one may argue that it should be subject
to the immunity bar and good faith defense established by the second
appellate court opinion in that case, at least to the extent that the plaintiff
seeks fees and costs in addition to an injunction. If, however, such equitable
relief exists separately from Bivens, then limiting concepts developed by the
Second Circuit's 1972 decision in that case should have no application in a
Bivens suit. In this author's opinion, no doctrines developed by the Bivens
series of cases should be construed to limit the scope of equitable remedies
which federal courts may fashion.
210
The problem of injunctive relief in a section 1331(a) case is probably
most likely to arise in connection with a request for a preliminary injunction
sought to restrain continuing misconduct.21' Various decisions have estab-
208. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
391-94 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527, 531-37 (1881). But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240 (1975). There the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees in any
type of federal litigation unless (1) there is a contract or statute granting such fees, (2) the
successful party conferred a common benefit by the recovery of a fund or property, (3) there
was willful disobedience of a court order by the losing party, or (4) the losing party acted
wantonly, vexatiously, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons. Id. at 257-59. Arguably, excep-
tion (4) is available in a case seeking equitable redress for deliberate deprivations of constitu-
tional rights; but in order to fit in under the exception the plaintiff must show that the defendant
vexatiously maintained an unfounded defense. Pre-litigation oppression apparently will not
suffice. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1976).
209. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 25 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
210. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a legal remedy can be granted only if a
claimant can prove he is vested with a legal right. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 431-33 (1964). But enforcement of an equitable claim requires no such proof. See Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942) (with reference to public interests only);
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551-52 (1937); Davis v. Romney, 490
F.2d 1360, 1368-69 (3d Cir. 1974).
211. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (1966) (defining notice required for and consolidation of a
preliminary injunction proceeding). Rule 65(c) requires posting of security in the event that trial
on the merits should show that the injunction ought not to have been issued. If the plaintiff
succeeds, the injunction will normally be modified so as to become permanent. A refusal by the
trial court to issue a preliminary injunction is an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1970). But taking such an appeal has its risks. The refusal by the trial court will not
normally be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion or an obvious error of law. Jones
v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 1970); Societ6 Comptoir de L'industrie Cotonniere
ttablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1962).
But on appeal, the reviewing court may consider the case in toto and even dismiss it on the
merits. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287 (1940); Smith v. Vulcan Iron
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lished that four prerequisites must be met before a federal court will issue a
preliminary injunction: first, a reasonable probability that the request will
succeed on the merits; second, irreparable injury to the movant for which no
legal remedy is adequate; third, proof that others will not suffer serious
adverse consequences because of the injunction; and fourth, the movant's
interest in having the injunction granted outweighs the public interest in
denying its issuance. 212 In practice this is a difficult burden to meet.
An example of how to meet this burden may be found in Illinois
Migrant Council v. Pilliod.213 The Illinois Migrant Council and several
individual plaintiffs sued various officials of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS), seeking to enjoin an alleged pattern of official
searches, seizures, detentions, and arrests directed against resident aliens of
Mexican descent. At the trial court, the issue was whether a preliminary
injunction could be obtained. Affidavits contended that INS agents would
stop Chicanos walking down public streets or driving their cars down public
highways, ask them for identification papers, and threaten them with incarc-
eration if such papers were not promptly produced.214 It was also alleged
that INS agents would compile lists of addresses at which illegal aliens
might be found and conduct mass raids of those premises. During these
raids, agents would knock on the doors of dwellings, identify themselves to
the occupants, enter the dwellings, search the premises without warrants,
and interrogate the occupants, occasionally subjecting those whom they felt
to be- uncooperative to verbal and physical abuse. 215 Official conduct was
governed by INS pamphlets which informed agents that they did not need
warrants to search dwellings and that they could make a stop or an arrest
without probable cause.
216
The trial judge issued a preliminary injunction. 217 He was convinced
Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897); McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 73-74 (8th Cir.
1976); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1972); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 382 F.2d 84, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Murray v.
McNeill, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
212. See, e.g., North Avondale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Hous.
Auth., 464 F.2d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1972); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Doeskin Products v. United Paper Co., 195 F.2d
356, 359 (7th Cir. 1952); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 710
(N.D. Ill. 1969). Some courts have added the requirement that the purpose of the preliminary
injunction must be one of preserving the status quo ante. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v.
Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Gittone, 110 F.2d
292, 293 (3d Cir. 1940).
213. 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1062, 1072 (7th Cir. 1976).
214. 398 F. Supp. at 887-88.
215. Id. at 889-91. Some of the dwellings were owned by the employer of the occupants,
Del Monte Canning Co.
216. See id. at 902-03.
217. Id. at 901.
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that the plaintiffs could succeed on the merits because the searches were
made without consent and the stop-and-frisks were made solely because a
person appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. But the court held that probabil-
ity of success on the merits also requires proof of a "reasonable probability
that the conduct was part of an official policy to the end that there is a
substantial likelihood that future violations will occur."'218 This prerequisite
was satisfied by the agency pamphlets which lent official sanction to
improper conduct and by the fact that even the minimal guidelines in those
pamphlets were not being consistently followed by those in the field. 219
Substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury was
also found. The court concluded that the Fourth Amendmhent violations by
the agents were serious injuries and that the monetary remedy of Bivens was
inadequate because a continuing pattern of unconstitutional deprivation of
rights existed. 220 No adverse consequences to others were found, because
compelling the agents to obey the Constitution could only benefit the public
as a whole. 221 As for balancing the competing interests at stake, the district
court said vigorous enforcement and immigration laws would not justify
unlawful conduct by government officials. 222 Pilliod graphically illustrates
the obstacles that must be overcome by a plaintiff seeking to vindicate his
constitutional rights by means of an equitable remedy. But the reluctance of
federal courts to grant such relief is entirely reasonable in light of the fact
that a plaintiff denied such redress will have recourse to the remedy of
damages created by Bivens. This serves to emphasize the point that it is
unreasonable to interpret Bivens as the source of both a legal and an
equitable cause of action.
218. Id. at 901-02 (citing Washington Free Comm. Inc. v. Wilson, 484 F.2d 1078, 1081
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Long v. District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Cf. Golden
v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (declaratory judgments).
219. 398 F. Supp. at 903.
220. Id. at 904 (citing Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969);
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 1966)).
221. 398 F. Supp. at 904.
222. Id. The decisive factor in the district court's rationale may have been its conclusion
that the "stop-and-frisks" were clearly contrary, and the warrantless searches were probably
contrary to prior Supreme Court rulings. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975)
(INS searches of vehicles at traffic checkpoints are illegal unless made with consent of the
driver or with probable cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-86 (1975)
(INS agents may stop and frisk persons only on a reasonable suspicion that they are aliens and
not merely because they appear to be of Mexican ancestry); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (a warrantless search made on the basis of coerced consent violates the
Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (warrantless
INS search of a vehicle at a site which is not the functional equivalent of a border violates the
Fourth Amendment unless justified by probable cause).
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B. Selected Substantive Problems
1. Applicability to Other Amendments
The Supreme Court in Bivens dealt only with the Fourth Amendment.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, discussed prior Supreme
Court rulings on that amendment to show why it was necessary to provide a
federal cause of action to vindicate the right of privacy it guarantees.
22
Moreover, the damage remedy announced by the Court was found to be one
arising primarily from the Fourth Amendment's proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 224 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
specifically said that the monetary relief created by the majority was a
permissible form of redress in a claim arising under the Fourth Amendment,
but he noted that "[t]he same, of course, may not be true with respect to
other types of constitutionally protected interests, and therefore the appro-
priateness of money damages may well vary with the nature of the personal
interest asserted.
' ' 225
In light of these considerations, a number of federal courts have been
unwilling to extend the Bivens remedy to cases not involving the Fourth
Amendment. 226 Others have simply declined to address the issue.227 The
223. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392-94 (1971).
224. Id. at 397.
225. Id. at 409 n.9 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). In Monroe, Justice Harlan talks about the unavailability of damage remedies for
such things as loss of voting rights, the harm caused by being psychologically coerced to
confess, and the harm caused by being compelled to attend segregated schools.
226. La Bar v. Royer, 528 F.2d 548, 549 (5th Cir. 1976) (limited Bivens to its factual
analogues); Livingood v. Townsend, 422 F. Supp. 24, 27-28 (D. Minn. 1976); Schofield v.
County of Volusia, 413 F. Supp. 908, 909 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Bankhead v. Cowin, 405 F. Supp.
326, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (dictum) (indicated that Bivens might be very difficult to apply in
contexts other than those arising under the Fourth Amendment); Jones v. United States, 401 F.
Supp. 168, 174 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Moro v. Telemundo Incorporado, 387 F. Supp. 920, 924 n.l
(D.P.R. 1974) (dictum); Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Colo. 1974); Moore v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974); McLaughlin v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885,
893 n.4 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (dictum) (in the context of a Fifth Amendment claim Bivens applies
only where no remedy already exists); Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690, 692-93 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (dictum); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 362 F. Supp. 870, 877 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622, 626 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(dictum); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1972).
227. The Second Circuit has failed to do so on several occasions. New York Pathological &
X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 523 F.2d 79, 82 n.5 (2d Cir.
1975); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 404 (2d Cir. 1975); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514
F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d
96, 103-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). The same is true of the District of
Columbia Circuit. Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 562-63 n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Cardinale v. Washington Technical Inst., 500 F.2d 791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see
Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 965 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum). This silence by the Court
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view of the former group of courts has been aptly summarized by District
Judge John A. Reed: "The Bivens holding, in the opinion of this court,
should not be given an overly generous interpretation thereby expanding the
district courts' jurisdiction to situations not clearly within the ambit of the
Bivens case." 2 28 The underlying policy here is one of judicial self-restraint,
an unwillingness to go beyond the boundaries set by the Supreme Court.
This is an entirely legitimate decision-making technique. But it is a tech-
nique which has rarely been followed in Bivens cases. An overwhelming
number of lower federal courts have extended or have indicated their
willingness to extend the Bivens doctrine to cases other than those involving
Fourth Amendment claims. 229 Often these extensions have been ipse dixits,
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has prompted at least some judges therein to extend
unilaterally the Bivens doctrine to other contexts. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410
F. Supp. 144, 161-62 (D.D.C. 1976); Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51,53 n.1 (D.D.C. 1975). On
the other hand, the district court opinions in the Second Circuit have divided equally on this
issue. Compare DeMaria v. Jones, 416 F. Supp. 291, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bankhead v. Cowin,
405 F. Supp. 326, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (both refusing to extend Bivens unilaterally) with
Turano v. Board of Educ., 411 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Blassingame v. United
States Attorney Gen., 387 F. Supp. 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (both extending Bivens to
situations other than those involving only the Fourth Amendment.)
228. Schofield v. County of Volusia, 413 F. Supp. 908, 909 (M.D. Fla. 1976). Judge Reed
indicated that to permit a suit against a county under Bivens would enable a plaintiff to do
something he would not be permitted to do under section 1983. Id. See text accompanying notes
302-42 infra.
229. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 873 (5th Cir. 1977) (Fifth Amendment); Cox v.
Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); Weir v.
Muller, 527 F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1976) (Fifth Amendment); Brault v. Town of Milton, 527
F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1975) (Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1975) (en
banc); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3rd Cir. 1975) (First Amendment); Yiamouyian-
nis v. Chemical Abstracts Serv., Inc., 521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir. 1975) (First Amendment);
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 932 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1975) (Fifth
Amendment); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974) (Fifth
Amendment); Sullivan v, Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 965 & n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Fifth Amend-
ment) (dictum), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1974); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d
1, 7 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1973) (Fourteenth Amendment) (dictum); United States ex rel. Moore v.
Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972) (Fifth Amendment); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163,
1164-65 (3d Cir. 1971) (Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc., v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1088-89 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (First Amendment)
(dictum); Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Fourteenth
Amendment); Eisenberg v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 1274, 1277-78 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Fifth
Amendment); Coomes v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 975, 983 (D.S.D. 1976) (Fifth Amendment);
Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (First and Eighth Amendments)
(dictum); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161-62 (D.D.C. 1976) (First
and Sixth Amendments); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156 (N.D. III. 1975) (Fourteenth
Amendment); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Ninth Amendments); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 1975)
(First and Fifth Amendments); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (First and Fourteenth Amendments); Blassingame v. United States Attorney Gen., 387 F.
Supp. 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (First and Eighth Amendments) (dictum); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 121-22 & n.5 (N.D. I11. 1974) (Fourteenth Amendment); Shaffer v.
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but on occasion a court has tried to explain the rationale underlying its
decision.
In Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,230 First and Sixth Amendment
claims were presented. 231 The plaintiffs were members of a political club in
West Germany composed mostly of American citizens. It supported the
election of George McGovern for president in 1972 and the impeachment
proceedings against Richard Nixon in 1973; it also operated a legal aid
service for American soldiers stationed in West Germany. It was alleged
that United States Army Intelligence placed the club and its activities under
electronic surveillance, covertly infiltrated its membership with army agents
for the purpose of disrupting its servicemen's counseling activities, drew up
blacklists which caused several of the plaintiffs to be fired from their jobs at
the United States exhibit at the German Industrial Fair and from their jobs at
private firms, debarred other plaintiffs from military installations in Berlin,
and caused West German authorities to institute deportation proceedings
against one plaintiff. 232 The district court said of the First Amendment
claim:
Courts that have extended Bivens to other constitutionally
protected interests have seen no compelling distinction between
the fourth and first or fifth amendments. Clearly the interests to be
protected are equally if not more fundamental. And once a citizen's
first amendment rights have been violated, he is without redress in
the absence of a monetary award. When a person has, however
temporarily, lost the freedom of expression guaranteed him by the
Constitution, because a federal official has attempted to restrain
that person's expression, the injury is simply too great to permit it
to go unredressed. 233
Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 554, 562 (D. Colo. 1974) (Fifth Amendment) (dictum); United States ex
rel. Harrison v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Fifth Amendment); Gardels v.
Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. III. 1974) (First Amendment); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto,
372 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (Fifth Amendment); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp.
223, 229 (D. Conn. 1974) (Fourteenth Amendment); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035,
1039-40 (D. Hawaii 1973) (First and Fifth Amendments); Dupree v. CitN of Chattanooga, 362 F.
Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (Fourteenth Amendment); James v. United States, 358 F.
Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.R.I. 1973) (Fifth and Eighth Amendments) (dictum), vacated, 502 F.2d
1159 (1st Cir. 1974); Washington v. Brantley, 352 F. Supp. 559, 564 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (Four-
teenth Amendment) (dictum); Johnson v. Alldredge, 349 F. Supp. 1230, 1231 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(Fifth Amendment), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973);
Howard v. Warden, Petersburg Reformatory, 348 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1972) (First
and Ninth Amendments); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. International U. of Op. Eng'rs
Local No. 542, 347 F. Sulp. 268, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Thirtdenth and Fourteenth Amendments)
(dictum); Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 53 n.1 (D.D.C. 1975) (all constitutional interests).
230. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
231. Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment violations were also alleged. Id. at 148. The
court did not discuss these claims in detail, however.
232. Id. at 147-48.
233. Id. at 161.
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As to the Sixth Amendment claim arising from electronic eavesdrop-
ping of an attorney-client conference, the district court found damages
rather than reversal of the conviction to be both necessary and appropriate.
Appropriateness was found because courts were said to be well-equipped to
take into account causation and damages.2 34 Necessity was found because:
A criminal who has been convicted. . . has suffered obvious harm
through loss of his reputation, his financial resources, and perhaps
his freedom pending appeal. Reversal on appeal may ameliorate the
extent of these damages; it cannot eradicate them. If a conviction
has been caused at least in part by violation of the criminal's Sixth
Amendment rights, there is no adequate remedy other than dam-
ages to redress fully the resultant harm.
2 35
In States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz,236 customs agents boarded
plaintiff's vessel docked in the port of Charleston, South Carolina and
seized cargo valued at $39,619.45. The agents did not have permission to
board the ship and did not have a warrant. The District Director of Customs
informed States Marine Lines that the seized items were being held subject
to forfeiture for alleged statutory violations; the plaintiff could not recover
the cargo unless it was willing to pay penalties. States Marine Lines sued for
$50,000 in damages. 237 The plaintiff alleged that there was a violation of the
Fifth Amendment actionable under Bivens.238 The court noted that the
plaintiff in this case sought to vindicate property and not liberty interests and
that in Bivens the Supreme Court had found that "[h]istorically damages
have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty."' 239 But the court went on to conclude that in section
1983 cases the Supreme Court has permitted suits for deprivation of proper-
ty without due process of law24° and that it would therefore be anomalous to
deny the same right to sue under the Fifth Amendment. 241 Again, a damage
remedy was found to be necessary and appropriate:
The necessity and appropriateness of judicial relief is no less com-
pelling in this case than it was in Bivens. As in Bivens: A common
law or state tort remedy may or may not afford a means of redres-
sing this wrong, but in any case, will not be tailored specifically to
cases of lawlessness pursuant to federal authority; the claim pre-
sented is obviously appropriate for money damages; and other
remedies such as injunctive or relief in the nature of mandamus are
no longer viable alternatives.
242
234. Id. at 162. For similar views expressed by Justice Harlan, see note 151 and accom-
panying text supra.
235. 410 F. Supp. at 162.
236. 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
237. Id. at 1147-48.
238. Id. at 1156.
239. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971) (emphasis added).
240. 498 F.2d at 1154 (citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)).
241. 498 F.2d at 1157.
242. Id.
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Butler v. United States243 arose out of alleged violations of First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights by named and unnamed military person-
nel stationed at Hickam Air Force Base. 244 The court found it to be anomal-
ous that damages for First Amendment violations could be exacted from
state officials but not from federal officials. 245 Moreover, it noted that
damages were the only practicable form of redress once the occasion for
exercising one's right of free speech has passed. 246 Additionally, the district
court said:
First Amendment rights are no less important than Fourth
Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights. They are, in fact, historic-
ally interrelated. The progression of cases which have read the
First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment did so by find-
ing the First Amendment freedoms to be personal liberties protect-
ed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
same incorporation took place in the federal area. Thus protection
of First Amendment rights through the Fifth Amendment against
federal action rests on the same Constitutional imperatives as
through the Fourteenth Amendment against state action.247
Considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Bivens, one may ask
whether these decisions are justified. One can offer several reasons to
support the conclusion that they are. First, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius should not be applied to decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Court in Bivens discussed the Fourth Amendment because that was all
that was before it. Its silence regarding damage remedies for infringements
of other constitutional rights cannot properly be construed as a rejection of
any extension of those remedies to violations of other provisions of the Bill
of Rights. Second, the very ipen-ended character of the Bivens decision
indicates that-the lower federal courts were to have a good deal of discretion
in administering the legal remedy which the Court created. Extension of the
Bivens remedy to other constitutional provisions is arguably part and parcel
of the discretion with which the district courts and courts of appeals were in
243. 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
244. Id. at 1039. The plaintiffs sought to enter Hickam Air Force Base to protest the
Vietnam war during a public campaign speech to be delivered there by President Nixon.
Military personnel detained, fingerprinted, and photographed plaintiffs, and eventually denied
them access. In all, seven different causes of action were pleaded against the military au-
thorities. See id. at 1037-38.
245. Id. at 1040.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted). In regard to the incorporation that takes place in the
federal area, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). For the interrelationship of the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, see Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1965)
(quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "The commands
of our First Amendment (as well as the prohibitions of the Fourth and the Fifth) reflect the
teachings of Entick v. Carrington,. . . [19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)]. These three amendments
are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection against self-incrimina-
tion but 'conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.' ")
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fact given. Third, the key to Bivens was the unavailability of other adequate
legal remedies. 248 As Schultz and Rumsfeld suggest, that problem is equally
pressing in cases involving First, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment claims. There
would appear to be no sound reason to grant access to the courts only for
Fourth Amendment violations; certainly Fourth Amendment guarantees are
not manifestly more important than those of the First, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendments. 249 The court in Bivens quoted language from Bell v. Hood250
to the effect that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.'251 Should this rule be any less
valid in First or Fifth Amendment cases than it is in Fourth Amendment
cases? Plainly not, especially in view of the "historic interrelationship
252
of these constitutional provisions.
Two caveats are necessary. As Schultz noted, 253 Bivens addresses
itself to infringements of liberty, not property. 254 It could be argued that
remedies for violations of the Fifth Amendment which deprive a person of
property should be left to state law, notwithstanding section 1983 decisions
to the contrary. But the argument that a deprivation of a property interest
without due process of law somehow merits less protection than a similar
impairment of a liberty interest is a specious one. As the Supreme Court has
pointed out in another context,
the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is a "personal" right,
whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, oK
a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in
property. Neither could have meaning without the other.
255
In light of this rationale, it seems sensible to conclude, as the court in
Schultz did, that Bivens provides a remedy for all types of infringements of
the Fifth Amendment. A second caveat is that Justice Brennan in Bivens
spoke of the absence of "special factors counselling hesitation" in that
248. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
249. But see note 61 and accompanying text supra.
250. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
251. Id. at 684 (footnote omitted), quoted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
252. See note 247 supra.
253. See note 239 and accompanying text supra.
254. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at
395. See note 239 supra.
255. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). Justice Brennan's majority
opinion was referring to a suit brought under section 1983 and section 1343(3) (see note 33
supra), but his argument has equally forceful implications for suits brought under Bivens and
section 1331(a). However, later rulings of the Supreme Court suggest that interests in liberty
and interests in property may not be coextensive. See notes 479, 483,.and accompanying text
infra.
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case.756 Such factors do not seem to exist in cases involving requested
extensions of the Bivens doctrine to the rest of the first nine amendments for
the reasons previously stated. They may exist, however, in cases involving
requested extensions of Bivens to the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 7
2. Application of the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
It is a well-established rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior, or
vicarious liability, 258 does not exist in a case brought under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 259 The Supreme Court in Bivens never considered the
problem. As might be expected, some lower courts have applied the doc-
trine in a Bivens suit, 260 while others have not.
261
Several decisions emanating from the district courts in Illinois illustrate
the problems surrounding this area of the law. The initial ruling came in
Jamison v. McCurrie.262 That case arose from a suit against the city of
Chicago and several of its police officers. It was alleged that the police
wrongfully refused to incarcerate the murderer of the plaintiff's decedent;
it was further alleged that the city was liable both because it was responsible
for the improper training of its law enforcement officers and because it was
responsible under the theory of respondeat superior. 263 Considering the
256. Id. at 396. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 345-65 and accompanying text infra. The discussion at that juncture of the
article will focus upon the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to certain types of Bivens-
based suits.
258. For the background of and the policy considerations underlying this concept, see W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 458-59 (4th ed. 1971).
259. The issue was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 191 (1961). Lower courts have consistently held, however, that vicarious liability has no
place in a section 1983 suit. Hampton v. Holmsburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d
Cir. 1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541,546 (2d Cir. 1974); Kish v. County of Milwaukee,
441 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1971); Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180 (1st Cir. 1970);
Candelaria v. Valdez, 353 F. Supp. 1096, 1097 (D. Colo. 1973); Boyden v. Troken, 352 F. Supp.
722, 723 (N.D. Il. 1973); Jennings v. Davis, 339 F. Supp. 919, 921 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Barrows v.
Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (N.D. Okla. 1971); Nugent v. Sheppard, 318 F. Supp. 314,
315 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972, 987 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Salazar v.
Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Colo. 1966); Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731,737 (W.D. Mo.
1963).
260. See, e.g., Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402,410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Rende v. Rizzo, 418 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Shifrin v. Wilson. 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1307
(D.D.C. 1976) (supplemental opinion); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557, 559 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F.
Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F. Supp. 1068,
1079 n.16 (D. Md. 1975).
261. See, e.g., Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334,337 (10th Cir. 1976); Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co.,
414 F. Supp. 52, 54 (N.D. I11. 1976); Gresham v. City of Chicago, 405 F. Supp. 410, 412 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990, 994 (N.D. I11. 1975); Jackson v. Wise, 385 F.
Supp. 1159, 1162-63 (D. Utah 1974); Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366,
1377 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
262. 388 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. II1. 1975).
263. Id. at 992.
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Supreme Court's decision in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,2 64 the district court
found authority to entertain the suit under Bivens and section 1331(a).
265
The court in Jamison refused, however, to find any liability for purportedly
negligent training because of the perceived impropriety of federal courts
assuming the roles of "super-administrators. ''26 As to any theory of re-
spondeat superior, the court held, "[t]o create vicarious liability under the
constitution with the present facts (non-systematic failure to arrest) in the
absence of any stated congressional policy is, in the mind of this Court,
unjustified. 
26 7
The next decision came in Williams v. Brown, 268 in which suit was
brought against various police officers and the city of Chicago for an alleged
unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. Again, jurisdiction was sustained
under Bivens and section 1331(a),269 As to the damage liability of the
municipality, the district court said that the city's responsibility "for the
unconstitutional acts of its employees is particularly appropriate.in the area
of police misconduct. Judges and commentators have asserted that, as a
matter of public policy, municipalities should be liable for the torts of their
police.'"270 The court found no bar to the suit against the city because of the
Eleventh Amendment, 271 and it noted that under Illinois law a municipality
is normally liable for the intentional torts of its agents.
272
264. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). See notes 82-93 and accompanying text supra.
265. See note 32 supra.
266. 388 F. Supp. at 992. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976).
267. 388 F. Supp. at 994.
268. 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. III. 1975).
269. Id. at 156.
270. Id. at 159.
271. Id. at 160. See notes 345-65 and accompanying text infra.
272. Id. (citing Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52 III. 2d 27, 31, 282 N.E.2d 144, 148
(1971)). There has been some question as to whether state common law immunities should
protect a municipality sued under section 1331(a). A few courts have said such local law as
there is should be applicable. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974),
vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 916
(E.D. Pa. 1974). But cf. Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1307 (D.D.C. 1976) (supplemental
opinion). The court in Shifrin characterized the purpose of such common law immunity as that
of preventing threats to the efficient functioning of government. But, the court reasoned, since
the officials of that government are not immune under local law in a constitutional tort case,
that efficient functioning is impaired at the moment a suit is lodged. Therefore, there would
seem to be no reason to continue to allow local law to shield the municipality from vicarious
liability. Of course, this entire problem becomes moot if the federal court deciding the case
happens to be situated in one of the increasing number of states which have dispensed with the
doctrine of local sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 802, 473 P.2d 937,
944 (1970); Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 540, 264 A.2d
34, 37 (1970); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 387, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (1963);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39-41, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624-25 (1962); Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1961); Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 I11. 2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959). See generally W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 975-87 (4th ed. 1971).
Summer 1977] BIVENS AND ITS PROGENY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In Gresham v. City of Chicago, 273 the plaintiff alleged false imprison-
ment and unlawful arrest; he sued individual police officers and the city of
Chicago. The district court noted that no allegation of wrongdoing was
tendered against the city. 274 It said that" [h]olding a municipality liable on a
vicarious liability or respondeat superior theory, however, raises serious
constitutional problems as to the power of the federal government to create
such liability.''275 Absent a clear-cut congressional authorization to bring
such a cause of action, the district court believed it was bound to dismiss the
suit against the city.276 Gresham was followed by Collum v. Yurkovich.277
The plaintiff therein alleged that he was beaten by policemen while in
custody. He sued the individual officers and the city of Chicago under the
theory of respondeat superior. The district court determined that it had
jurisdiction. 278 It held, as in Williams, that since state law would render the
city liable, federal courts in a Bivens type of action could apply the doctrine
of vicarious liability; any claim to the contrary was deemed "ill-found-
ed." 2
79
The last and most recent decision in this series came in Weiss v. J. C.
Penney Co.280 In this case, the plaintiff alleged that agents of J.C. Penney
Co. (who accused him of theft) combined with the police officers of Niles,
Illinois, to threaten, forcibly imprison, and coerce a confession from him. 2
81
The district court found sufficient state action to create a cause of action
under Bivens, section 1331(a), and the Fourteenth Amendment. 282 After
noting the disparate results in Gresham and Williams, the court simply said
that "the better reasoned view would result in this court's not fashioning a
monetary remedy under the theory of respondeat superior in the instant
case. The situation here is not so extraordinary as to necessitate providing an
unusual remedy."
283
Thus within one district, two opinions took one approach while three
took another. Deciding which result is better poses certain difficulties.
Section 1983 actions do not encompass the theory of respondeat superior.284
A number of courts have deemed Bivens to be the federal counterpart of a
section 1983 suit and hence governed by similar criteria.285 If so, the
273. 405 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. II. 1975).
274. Id. at 412.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 409 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
278. Id. at 558.
279. Id. at 559.
280. 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. III. 1976).
281. Id. at 53.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 54.
284. See note 259 supra.
285. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 1976); Brawer v. Horowitz,
535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975); Brubaker
v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
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conclusion of this syllogism should be that respondeat superior should not
apply in a Bivens action.286 The response to this syllogism is that Bivens
created a cause of action governed implicitly by the principles of the federal
common law of torts. Respondeat superior is an established principle of tort
law. Why then should the federal common law of torts be restricted by a
limitation judicially engrafted onto a statutory cause of action? This author
doubts that any compelling reason for such a restrictive approach exists;
certainly there is no language in Bivens supporting such a limiting interpre-
tation. Here, too, conclusive authority in the form of a Supreme Court ruling
would be very helpful.
3. Defendants Other Than Federal Officials
a. Persons and Non-Governmental Entities
The Supreme Court in Bivens dealt only with redress against federal
agents. A number of lower federal courts have said that in light of alterna-
tive remedies such as section 1983, the Bivens doctrine should be restricted
to suits against federal officials. 287 Other courts, as the cases cited in the
preceding section make clear, 288 disagree and have applied Bivens in suits
alleging unconstitutional conduct by state officials. The theory put forward
by one court is that:
Although Bivens dealt with the availability of a federal remedy
against federal officers for violation of rights secured by the fourth
amendment, its analysis is arguably capable of being extended to
create a remedy at law against state officers who have allegedly
violated rights secured by other federal constitutional provisions.28 9
Yet other courts have taken the ultimate step and found the conduct of
private individuals or entities to be actionable under Bivens.
In McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. ,290 the plaintiff was indicted for
aircraft piracy. Prior to trial, he was incarcerated in the Federal Medical
Center in Springfield, Missouri, for psychiatric observation. A report made
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1166 (3d
Cir. 1971); Lowery v. Hauk, 422 F. Supp. 490, 493 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Rende v. Rizzo, 418 F.
Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Gissen v. Tackman, 401 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D.N.J. 1975). Contra,
Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Conn. 1972).
286. But is it permissible to say section 1983 practices and procedures are carried over into
Bivens causes of action? Certainly some are, but others are not. For further discussion and
comparison, see text accompanying notes 417-28 infra.
287. See, e.g., United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 27 (3d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Rogers,
449 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1971); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (D.N.H. 1976);
Gambling v. Cornish, 412 F. Supp. 243, 244 (N.D. Il. 1975); Coleman v. Tennessee Valley
Trades & Lab. Coun., 396 F. Supp. 671, 676 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp.
323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Moro v. Telemundo Incorporado, 387 F. Supp. 920, 924 n.1 (D.P.R.
1974); Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 528, 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1973);
Rodriguez v. Barcelo, 358 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.P.R. 1973).
288. See cases cited in note 260 supra.
289. Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 229 (D. Conn. 1974).
290. 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976).
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as the result of such observation was partially read into the public record
during a pretrial hearing. An assistant federal district attorney prosecuting
the case transferred a copy of this report to a correspondent for the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch; portions of the document were quoted in a subsequent article
on the trial.291 McNally sued, inter alia, the federal attorney, the reporter,
and the newspaper under section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act292 and
under Bivens. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found no cause of action stated under section 1985(3) because no conspiracy
involving racial or class-based discrimination had been alleged or proven.
293
The appellate court did find a cause of action stated under Bivens, however,
both against the federal attorney and the private defendants who were
alleged to have "acted in concert with a federal official acting under color of
federal law."
294
In Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Service, Inc., 295 the plaintiff
was a biochemist employed by the defendant private firm. He took a
vigorous public position against the flouridation of drinking water, a posi-
tion that conflicted with the official policy of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. CAS warned the plaintiff to desist in airing his
views publicly on this subject. When he refused, he was placed on probation
and eventually resigned. 296 The plaintiff sued, alleging a cause of action
under Bivens. 297 He contended that because CAS had received partial
federal funding and because the firm had been pressured by HEW to
discipline the plaintiff, the requisite governmental action was present. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found a cause of action
under Bivens and remanded the case for further proceedings so that the
plaintiff could be given the opportunity to prove the alleged concerted
activity of CAS and HEW.
298
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers,299 the state attorney general and
twelve black constituents of Local 542 sued the defendant union in a class
action, alleging discrimination against black members. 3° Approximately
seven months after the initial suit was lodged, the plaintiffs sought an
291. Id. at 72.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970): "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire
...for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal protection and immunities under the laws;. ..the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." See note 318 infra.
293. 532 F.2d at 75.
294. Id.
295. 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1975).
296. Id. at 1392-93.
297. Id. at 1393.
298. Id.
299. 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
300. Id. at 272.
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injunction pendente lite, alleging that union members and officials had at
various times harassed and intimidated the individual parties to the original
class action.3"' The district court relied on Bivens for the "proposition that
there is an implied right for damages and for injunctive relief arising from
the mere enactment of the 13th and 14th amendments to the
Constitution. "302
Last, in Gardels v. Murphy303 a lawsuit arose from the activities of
advancement for President Nixon during a visit to the town of Pekin,
Illinois, in June of 1973. A group protesting the war in Vietnam and the
bombing of Cambodia joined the crowds queueing to hear President Nixon
speak; they carried placards which stated "Stop the War" and "You Can't
Hide from Watergate in Pekin." Pro-administration groups were carrying
their own signs and banners were also present. It was alleged that one
Murphy and others belonging to the Presidential Advance Office harassed
and assaulted the plaintiffs, who were members of the anti-war contin-
gent. 3°4 A suit was brought under Bivens alleging First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendment violations and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the
named defendants were Murphy and the Director of the White House
Advance Office, one Henkel. 305 The latter was granted a summary judg-
ment; the district court found he had acted within the scope of his authority
and, because his duties were discretionary in nature, he was immune from
suit under the doctrine of Barr v. Matteo. 306 Murphy pointed out that he was
a private businessman who acted as a spare-time advanceman; his expenses
were not paid by the government, but by the Republican Party and the
Committee to Re-Elect the President. 3 7 The district court responded that the
visit to Pekin was not a partisan campaign trip; it noted that the Advance
Office was an executive department that had apparently delegated part of its
duties to a political party. 308 Thus it concluded that "a political party could
establish a common law agency with the government whenever the govern-
ment delegates authority to it. "309 As a result of this and the fact that the
Presidential Advance Office monitored Murphy's duties, the court deemed
the "mantle of federal authority to be draped around him" and denied a
summary judgment in his favor.
310
301. Id. at 273-78.
302. Id. at 286. Injunctive relief was in fact granted on the basis of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), -5(f) (1964). See 347 F. Supp. at 287.
303. 377 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. II1. 1974).
304. Id. at 1392.
305. Id. at 1393.
306. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
307. 377 F. Supp. at 1398-99.
308. Id. at 1399.
309. Id. (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944), for an analogous principle).
310. 377 F. Supp. at 1399.
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These decisions are arguably not legitimate extensions of Bivens. A
key point in that case was the unavailability of adequate alternative reme-
dies. 311 The Court in Bivens noted that a suit against federal agents in state
courts might be stymied both by the fact that the state judiciary has only
limited power to restrict federal authority312 and the fact that the guarantees
of the Fourth Amendment reach conduct other than that deemed impermiss-
ible by the State. 313 These considerations are not really present in cases
involving state officials and private parties. First, the conduct of a state's
citizens is a proper subject for state and not for federal regulation; the
concept of federalism would suggest that state tort law should govern
disputes between private citizens of a state. But what of the claim that the
state official or the private party is acting in an unconstitutional fashion?
Again, adequate alternative remedies exist. A state officer acting under
color of state law is liable under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
3 14
Private parties may be liable under sections 1981,315 1982,316 1983,317 and
311. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
312. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
313. Id. at 392.
314. See note 31 supra.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that this statute applies to private action. Runyon v.
McCrary, 95 S. Ct. 2586, 2593-95 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
459-60 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431,439-40 (1973); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." This statute has also been construed to
reach purely private conduct. Runyon v. McCrary, 95 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (1976); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1968).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 has been construed to reach private persons
acting in concert with state officials to deprive a person of his constitutional rights. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970); United States v. Price. 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7
(1966); Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1975); Barnes v. Dorsey,
480 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1973). McNally and Yiamouyiannis might be explained by saying
that the courts therein adopted by analogy this "in concert" theory for Bivens types of cases.
But given the policy considerations underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens, this
technique of implication by analogy would seem to be impermissible. The Court expressly
found a plaintiff's remedies at state law to be inadequate because of the inherent authority
exercised by federal officers and the concomitant inability of local tribunals to effectively curb
abuses of that authority. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. The same difficulties
would not appear to exist in suits brought in state courts against private parties.
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1985(3)318 of the same enactment. No additional remedies would seem to be
mandated by the Constitution. Even the cases extending Bivens have not
cited any evidence that demonstrated that existing means of redress are
inadequate. Moreover, extending Bivens to private parties or state officers
may entitle them to immunity or to a good faith defense, which they would
not have at state law. 319 The policy reasons for creating a damage remedy
against federal officers are not present in suits against state officers and
private parties. It is arguably undesirable to derive from Bivens a general
federal cause of action against all manner of tortfeasors simply because
their conduct is also constitutionally impermissible.
b. Governmental Entities
Decisions handed down by the Supreme Court have established that
municipalities 320 and counties321 are not amenable to suit under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act. 322 Nonetheless a number of lower federal courts
318. See note 292 supra. Section 1985(3) does apply to purely private conspiracies. Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671,676 (10th
Cir. 1973); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Barrio v. McDonough
Dist. Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. I11. 1974). The usual evidentiary prerequisites for a
cause of action under section 1985(3) are proof of: (I) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) for the
purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection or privileges and
immunities under the law and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy resulting in (4) an
injury to or deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir.
1973). The courts usually deem the presence of invidiously discriminatory motivation to be
decisive. Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra at 101-02; Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Economic Action Comm., 504 F.2d 563,564-65 (5th Cir. 1974); Arnold v.
Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974); Bricker v. Crane,
468 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973). But at least one court
was willing to extend section 1985(3) to cases where no such invidious discrimination would
arguably seem to exist. See Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). See also Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d
1227, 1232, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1971); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971).
319. No case actually grapples with the problem with respect to private parties. Arguably
such parties should not be entitled to any type of official immunity, but they may be entitled to a
claim of good faith regarding their conduct. State officers are subject to the constructions
placed upon their potential defenses in section 1983 litigation. In regard to whether Bivens-
based cases interpret section 1983 precedents differently, see notes 407-44 and accompanying
text infra.
320. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187 (1961).
321. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 (1973). Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S.
Ct. 2413, 2421 (1976) (held Federal courts may not exercise pendent jurisdiction over a county
on a State law claim factually related to a section 1983 claim against county officials).
322. See note 31 supra. It is well established that a state is not suable under section 1983.
Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 975 (1967); Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 58 (9th Cir. 1967); Willford v. California, 352
F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex reL Lee v. Illinois, 343 F.2d 120, 120 (7th Cir.
1965); Christman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 272 F. Supp. 805, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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have found (or indicated a willingness to find) that municipalities, counties,
and other local governmental entities are subject to suit under a combination
of Bivens and section 1331(a).32 3 Thus in Dahl v. City of Palo Alto324 a
property owner sued the city for appropriating his land by means of a
rezoning ordinance passed after the city annexed the Foothills area. The
plaintiff alleged deprivation of property without due process of law required
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 325 The district court found a valid
claim jurisdictionally based upon section 1331(a)326 and carefully distin-
guished that statute from section 1983:
But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2671-72 (1976). In that decision, the Supreme Court
said that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay suit (based on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act) against a state. In dictum, the Court offered the generalization that the enforcement
provisions of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. Whether or not this dictum presages a shift in judicial policy is as yet unclear.
323. Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d
730, 732 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc); Singleton
v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 1974); Cardinale v. Washington
Technical Inst., 500 F.2d 791, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing only Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946)); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, .477 F.2d 1,7 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1973) (dictum); Sanabria
v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Oen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township,
420 F. Supp. 709, 715-17 (D.N.J. 1976); Sheets v. Stanley Community School Dist. No. 2, 413
F. Supp. 350, 351 (D.N.D. 1975) (dictum), aff'd, 532 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1976); Shifrin v. Wilson,
412 F. Supp. 1282, 1307-08 (D.D.C. 1976); Demkowicz v. Enary, 411 F. Supp. 1184, 1193 (S.D.
Ohio 1975); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Lombard v. Board of
Educ., 407 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Barszcz v. Board of Trustees 400 F. Supp.
675, 676 (N.D. I11. 1975) (dictum), aff'd, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Schoonfield v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 n.16 (D. Md. 1975) (dictum); Williams v. Brown, 398 F.
Supp. 155, 157 (N.D. I11. 1975); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D.D. Pa.
1975) (dictum); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 121-22 (N.D. III. 1975); Maybanks
v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 914-16 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp.
647, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (N.D. Ohio
1973) (dictum); Dupree v. City of Chattanooga, 362 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). The
Third Circuit joined this series of cases in its decision in Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d
31, 44 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). On remand, it held that an
intervening state court decision required it to extend sovereign state immunity to the defendant
college. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 62 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Brungard v.
Hartman, 12 Pa. Cmwlth. 477, 479, 315 A.2d 913, 914 (1974)). Presumably the conclusion
reached in the first Skehan decision would apply to similar governmental entities in states
within the Third Circuit which do not extend sovereign immunity so widely. To understand why
the appellate panel's opinion in the Brault case is included in this list of decisions, see note 337
infra. See also Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations,
89 HARV. L. REv. 922, 929 (1976).
324. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
325. Id. at 648.
326. The plaintiff's cause of action was based on alleged violations of the Constitution (and
hence Bivens). Section 133 1(a) alone provides no substantive relief. See Pitrone v. Mercadante,
420 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Gresham v. City of Chicago, 405 F. Supp. 410, 412
(N.D. I11. 1975); Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990,991-92 (N.D. III. 1975); Perry v. Linke,
394 F. Supp. 323, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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The passage of § 1331 was also motivated by very different con-
siderations than those to which § 1983 was a response. § 1983 was
an effort by Congress to provide a forum and a remedy for those
whose rights were being violated but who could get no relief in the
courts or agencies of their states. . . Amendments were offered
extending liability specifically to include cities and counties, but
many members of Congress were unwilling to extend liability to
municipalities . . . . As finally passed, the act provided redress
only against the persons who were depriving others of their rights.
The Act of March 3, 1875, the predecessor of § 1331, on the other
hand, was the culmination of efforts dating back to the first Con-
gress to give general federal question jurisdiction to the federal
judiciary. . . . The record is silent as to whether Congress meant
to make municipalities liable for acts of their agents which violate
federal law. While it may be argued that Congress assumed that
suits in federal court against municipalities would be unconstitu-
tional, as had recently been vigorously argued in the debates over
the passage of § 1983 . . . it is not the role of this court to read in
such a limitation in the absence of legislative history.
327
Perhaps the most interesting of these decisions expanding the liability
of governmental entities is that rendered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Brault v. Town of Milton. 32 8 There also
the plaintiffs, owners of a trailer park, alleged deprivation of property
without the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
town of Milton had passed an ordinance prohibiting the use of mobile homes
within the township limits and sought to enforce this ordinance against the
Braults by means of an injunction. 329 The Vermont Supreme Court eventual-
ly held the ordinance invalid because the town had given insufficient notice
to those eligible to vote on the statute. 330 In a later decision, however, the
state supreme court found the town to be immune from a suit for damages
under state law. 331 The Braults sued in federal court under Bivens and
327. 372 F. Supp. at 651. The court also cited City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), for support. See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra. But see Raffety v. Prince
George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 (D. Md. 1976); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 423 F.
Supp. 446, 448 (D.S.C. 1976); Farnsworth v. Orem City, 421 F. Supp. 830, 831 (D. Utah 1976);
Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-90 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The court in Pitrone
specifically sought to rebut the rationale expressed in DahL It cited three reasons for its
conclusion: the availability of an alternative remedy under section 1983; the assertion that
because Congress expressed its wish to exempt municipalities from damage liability when it
enacted section 1983, that wish should control subsequent judicial construction regarding the
scope of section 1331(a); and the argument that because plaintiffs sue municipalities in order to
be assured of having at least one defendant capable of paying a judgment, to allow such suits
would thus frustrate the very legislative policy announced in the congressional debates preced-
ing the enactment of section 1983.
328. 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975).
329. Id. at 732.
330. Town of Milton v. Brault, 129 Vt. 431, 282 A.2d 681 (1971). For the rationale
underlying the state court's opinion, see Town of Milton v. LeClaire, 129 Vt. 495, 499, 282 A.2d
834, 836 (1971).
331. Town of Milton v. Brault, 132 Vt.377, 383, 320 A.2d 630, 634 (1974).
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section 1331(a). 332 The reviewing panel of the court of appeals found that
the claim for relief came "within Bivens' sweeping approbation of constitu-
tionally-based causes of action." ' 333 The purported conflict with section
1983 was dismissed with the statement that:
If a construction of § 1331 as authorizing such suits would render
meaningless the immunity enjoyed by municipalities under § 1983,
we might find this argument more persuasive. This is not in fact the
case, however, for § 1331, with its amount in controversy require-
ment, would preserve the municipality's § 1983 immunity as to
actions not involving the minimum sum . . . .Bell v. Hood and
Bivens itself, moreover, caution against assuming that Congress'
exemption for municipalities under § 1983 informed its efforts four
years later in establishing federal question jurisdiction.
334
The full court of appeals sitting en banc reversed, saying no cause of action
was stated because the Fourteenth Amendment had not been violated. 33 5 The
Braults, said the full court, had been granted notice, statement of the
charges against them, and an opportunity to defend in the town's suit against
them to enforce the ordinance. 336 Therefore, the full court of appeals
declined to discuss the Fourteenth Amendment issue.
337
It is legitimate for courts to rely on Bivens as a source of a cause of
action against local government entities. There is one key factor present in
these cases that was absent in the cases involving suits against state officials
and private persons: the lack of an alternative remedy. In most of these cases
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act would not provide a cause of action,338
and a suit in state courts might be prevented by local doctrines of sovereign
immunity.3 39 Consequently there is a definife need to have a forum avail-
able. Invoking legislative history provides no persuasive evidence to the
332. 527 F.2d at 733.
333. Id. at 734.
334. Id. at 735.
335. Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc). Accord, on
similar facts, Gordon v. City of Warren, 415 F. Supp. 556, 564-65 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
336. 527 F.2d at 738-39.
337. Id. at 736. What the en banc decision means is disputable. One court has said it is a
"recession" from the holding that Bivens encompasses a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Mitchell v. Libby, 409 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (D. Vt. 1976). But other courts seem to find the
appellate panel's reasoning to be controlling. See Cox v. Stanton, 429 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.
1975); Turano v. Board of Educ., 411 F. Supp. 205, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). And yet other courts
say that in light of the Second Circuit's indecision on this subject, they will decline to discuss it.
See Haber v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93, 94 (E.D.N.Y.), modified, 418 F. Supp. 1120
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Bankhead v. Cowin, 405 F. Supp. 326, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The Second
Circuit has since reiterated its wish to avoid providing any definitive answer to the problem. See
Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1975).
338. See notes 320-21 and accompanying text supra.
339. However, it should be noted that most courts in Bivens suits will apply local doctrines
of sovereign immunity. See note 272 supra.
[Vol. 4
contrary. As Dahl pointed out,34° the congressional debates preceding
enactment of section 1331(a) are unilluminating. The courts criticizing the
conclusions expressed in Dahl341 have done so by resorting to the technique
of implication by analogy; noting that Congress, in passing section 1983,
expressed an intent to exempt municipalities from damage liability, these
courts have imputed a similar limiting intent with respect to the enactment of
section 1331(a). Unfortunately, this analogy requires a comparable con-
struction of two very different statutes; section 1983 creates a cause of
action while section 1331(a) is merely a conferral of jurisdiction.342 A
proper use of the technique of implication by analogy would require com-
parison of section 1983 and Bivens. Making such a comparison discloses
the fallacy inherent in the reasoning of the courts which do not permit
Bivens-based suits against municipalities, because the Court in Bivens
never addressed this subject. Later Supreme Court decisions upholding
municipal immunity in section 1983 suits343 do not necessarily have implica-
tions for Bivens actions, because the Court, in handing down these subse-
quent decisions, confronted (as indicated above) specific statements by
members of Congress that evince an intent to limit the scope of the remedy
enacted. Because Bivens is a judicially-created cause of action, legislative
intent is not as relevant a concern. 344 At least one other special factor
"counselling hesitation" exists in these cases, however: the Eleventh
Amendment.345
340. See note 327 and accompanying text supra.
341. See note 327 supra.
342. See note 326 supra. For a general discussion of section 1983 vis-h-vis the various
jurisdictional sections of title twenty-eight of the United States Code, see Gonzalez v. Young,
46 U.S.L.W. 2064, 2065 (3d Cir., July 15, 1977). Of course, the court in Dahl is equally
blameworthy in this respect, because it was the first to make the confusing juxtaposition of
sections 1983 and 1331(a). See note 327 and accompanying text supra. The entire issue becomes
moot if one assumes, as many courts do, that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), held that section 1331(a) confers jurisdiction in suits against a
municipality. As pointed out earlier, that assumption is incorrect. See notes 92-94 and accom-
panying text supra.
343. See notes 320-21 and accompanying text supra.
344. The Court in Bivens did indicate that a damage remedy against federal officials might
not have been implied had there been an "explicit congressional declaration that persons
injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in
the view of Congress." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). But with respect to suits against municipalities and state subdivisions,
(a) there has been no "explicit congressional declaration" in the form of a statute or resolution,
(b) section 1983 is a patently ineffective alternative and (c) even if it were otherwise, it cannot
be said to be "effective in the view of Congress," absent some further legislative declaration.
345. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
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The Eleventh Amendment is not a defense to a Bivens type of action, it
is a bar to federal jurisdiction. 346 Courts have applied the amendment to
Bivens suits in three different ways. One approach is suggested by
Demkowicz v. Endry,347 a suit against a school board wherein a pregnant
teacher sought reinstatement because she was compelled to stop teaching
even though she was not physically incapable of doing so. The court noted
the Eleventh Amendment immunity claimed by the governmental unit, but
found that a school board cannot be equated with a sovereign state for the
purposes of the amendment.
348
A second approach is typified by the cases of Washington v. Brant-
ley349 and Perzanowski v. Salvio. 350 In Washington, the plaintiff alleged
that Brantley, a policeman employed by the city of Dunnellon, Florida, used
unnecessary force to apprehend him. 351 Suit was lodged against Brantley
and the city. The district court found a Fourteenth Amendment claim to be
cognizable under Bivens, but went on to say that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not repeal the Eleventh.352 Since a city was deemed to be a
subdivision of the state under Florida law,3 53 the court concluded that the
municipality of Dunnellon was immune from prosecution.35 4 In Perzanow-
ski, a lawsuit was instituted against a building inspector, a building commis-
sion, and the city of New Britain, Connecticut. It was alleged that these
defendants were responsible for wrongfully condemning and demolishing a
building owned by the plaintiff. 355 The court simply held one could not seek
damages from a political subdivision of a state (such as a municipality)
when the state itself could not be sued in federal court.
356
A third technique for dealing with the Eleventh Amendment issue was
adopted in Turano v. Board of Education of Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26.357 There a schoolteacher denied tenure sought only rein-
346. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299,305 (1952); Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933); Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1890).
347. 411 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
348. Id. at 1193.
349. 352 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
350. 369 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974).
351. 352 F. Supp. at 560.
352. Id. at 563-64.
353. See Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 432, 134 So. 205, 207 (1931); City of
Miami v. Lewis, 104 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
354. 352 F. Supp. at 565. Cf. Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1273 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975).
355. 369 F. Supp. at 225.
356. Id. at 230-31.
357. 411 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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statement nunc pro tunc under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 35 8 The
court found no Eleventh Amendment bar because only equitable relief was
being sought.35 9 It noted that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to state
a cause of action under Bivens and section 1331(a) as well. 360 Summary
judgment for the defendant school district was therefore denied. 361 Several
months after this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided Moneil v. Department of Social Services of New
York City,362 wherein it ruled both that a board of education is not a
"person" under section 1983 and that municipal employees may not be
sued for damages under section 1983 for acts violating a plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights unless they are sued as individuals and not in their official
capacity. 363 Monell held that a suit for damages, as distinct from one for
injunctive relief, cannot be brought against a state official qua official
because the real party in interest (and the one who would have to pay any
damages recovered by the plaintiff) is the state. 364 As a result of the Monell
decision, the district court in Turano issued a supplemental opinion saying
that the rationale of Monell would create an Eleventh Amendment bar in
suits under section 1983 and under section 1331(a).
365
Which of these techniques is proper? The Supreme Court has consis-
tently said that the Eleventh Amendment's bar to jurisdiction applies only in
suits against a state and not in suits against the subdivisions of a state, such
as a county or a municipality. 366 The one exception to this rule is where the
nominal defendant is a subdivision of the state but the actual defendant is the
state itself. 367 Thus the general analysis advanced in Monell is a proper
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and it would bar damage suits
brought under Bivens whenever the state would have to pay if the nominal
defendant loses. But if one takes this approach literally, no Bivens suit
seeking substantial damages could ever be brought against a school board or
a municipality or a county. Although such subdivisions of a state do
358. Id. at 209.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 210.
362. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
363. Id. at 264.
364. Id. at 265.
365. 411 F. Supp. at211.
366. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U.S. 636, 645 (1911); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1906); Workman v.
City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 565-66 (1900); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530
(1890).
367. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
462-64 (1945); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,
506-07 (1887); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1884).
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generate their own revenue, they are not financially autonomous. The state,
either directly or indirectly, subsidizes their continued functioning. The
problem thus becomes one of where to draw the line. 36 The approach in
Monell arguably extends the protection of the Eleventh Amendment too far.
A better approach might be found by considering the classic statement of the
''real party in interest" doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court in the case
of In re Ayers:
369
To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption
guaranteed by the I lth Amendment requires that it should be
interpreted, not literally and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such
breadth and largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of
its purpose. In this spirit it must be held to cover, not only suits
brought against a State by name, but those also against its officers,
agents, and representatives, where the State, though not named as
such, is, nevertheless, the only real party against which alone in
fact the relief is asked and against which the judgment or decree
effectively operates.
370
The broad rule of Ayers is really very narrow. Careful drafting of a
complaint can ensure that "the only real party against which alone in fact"
redress is sought is not just the state, but also the individual official or the
governmental subdivision. And certainly the rule of Monell (as well as the
368. One should not minimize the difficulties in drawing this line. In some cases the courts
have no difficulties. Thus, for example, a suit against a state court has generally been held to be
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir.
1970); Mackay v. Nesbett, 285 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D. Alas. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1970); Lenske v. Sercombe, 266 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (D. Ore. 1967); Campbell v. Washington
State Bar Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 991, 992 (W.D. Wash. 1967). Less obvious examples cause more
problems. Thus, for example, with regard to state highway commissions, the courts are evenly
divided as to whether the Eleventh Amendment bars an action in federal court. Compare
Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 272 F.2d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1959); Department
of Highways v. Morse Bros., 211 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1954); Sherman v. Ulmer, 201 F. Supp.
660, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (all denying immunity) with Harris v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n,
410 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); Simmons v. South
Carolina State Highway Dep't No. 1, 195 F. Supp. 516, 517 (E.D.S.C. 1961); Dunnuck v.
Kansas State Highway Comm'n, 21 F. Supp. 882, 883 (D. Kan 1938) (all upholding immunity).
Similar problems exist with respect to boards of education. Compare St. Helena Parish School
Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376, 377 (5th Cir. 1961); Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F.
Supp. 945, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (upholding the right to sue) with Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,
782 (8th Cir. 1962); Delevay v. Richmond County School Bd., 284 F.2d 340,340 (4th Cir. 1960);
Meyerhoffer v. East Hanover Township School Dist., 280 F. Supp. 81, 84 (M.D. Pa. 1968)
(upholding immunity from suit). These disparate decisions may be reconciled by saying that the
federal courts balance three different factors: (a) who the real party in interest is, (b) the scope
of the sovereign immunity doctrine under the law of the forum state, and (c) whether or not the
federal court is bound to apply the law of the forum state. At any rate, it is crucial to distinguish
between, for example, a school board as a discrete governmental entity and the individual
serving on that board. The individual's unconstitutional conduct is definitely actionable. Griffin
v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964). Accord, Exparte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
369. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
370. Id. at 506-07 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 383 infra.
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doctrine in Ayers) should not be applied to section 1331(a) claims seeking
injunctive relief against the unconstitutional acts of state officers.
371
4. Immunity and Good Faith
a. Section 1983 Precedents
It is well established that certain common law immunities survive in
section 1983 litigation.372 Thus state legislators,373 judges, 374 and prosecut-
ing attorneys 375 are all immune from suit for acts done within the scope of
their duties. Following the decision by the Second Circuit in Bivens in
1972,376 the Supreme Court handed down two rulings on good faith and
immunity in section 1983 cases that proved to be influential in Bivens
actions.
The first of these was Scheuer v. Rhodes.377 The case arose out of the
killing of three students by national guardsmen at Kent State University in
1970. The personal representatives of the estates of the decedents brought
suit against the governor of Ohio, the adjutant general and his assistants, the
president of the university, and various members of the Ohio National Guard
under section 1983.378 After the trial court found the proceeding barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, the case was appealed to the appellate court for
the Sixth Circuit. That court concluded that the governor and the president
of Kent State both enjoyed executive immunity, 379 that the national
guardsmen, acting as agents of the state, were also immune, 380 that the
adjutant general's office was immune because it was an instrumentality of
371. See cases cited in note 94 supra.
372. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 243-44 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951).
373. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951).
374. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-56 (1967). Accord, Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d
127, 129 (7th Cir. 1971); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1965); Rhodes v.
Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 718 (8th Cir. 1964); Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723,725 (6th Cir. 1963).
The immunity also extends to court clerks and assistants. Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81, 82
(8th Cir. 1970); Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826, 826 (9th Cir. 1969); Peckham v. Scanlon, 241
F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1957); Niklaus v. Simmons, 196 F. Supp. 691, 712 (D. Neb. 1961);
Ginsberg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596, 602-03 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955).
375. Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Accord, Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d
177, 180 (8th Cir. 1970); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967); Bauers v. Heisel,
361 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1966); Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723,725 (6th Cir. 1963); Cawley
v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1954); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624, 633 (D. Neb.),
aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962).
376. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
377. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
378. Id. at 234.
379. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1972).
380. Id. at 442.
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the state 381 and that, at any rate, the case presented a non-justiciable
controversy.
382
The Supreme Court reversed these rulings. It found no Eleventh
Amendment bar because the complaint sought to impose individual and
personal liability only on the named defendants, and not on the state of
Ohio.383 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion found no absolute "execu-
tive immunity" but only a qualified exemption from liability. This qualified
immunity from prosecution for acts done within the scope of one's duties
would vary with the discretion and responsibilities of the office held by a
defendant. 384 Chief Justice Burger stated that "[i]t is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in the light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct.' '385 The Court found no occasion for a "definitive explora-
tion" of the subject because of the scantiness of the record due to the fact
that the case was decided on the pleadings in the courts below; it was
remanded for further proceedings. 386
The second of these landmark decisions was Wood v. Strickland.387
Students enrolled at the Mena Public High School in Arkansas were expell-
ed for "spiking" punch served at a meeting attended by students and parents
and sponsored by an extra-curricular school organization on school
grounds. 388 The girls involved were initially suspended for two weeks by the
president of the school subject to the decision of the full school board. That
board, at a meeting attended by neither the disciplined students nor their
parents, first recommended leniency. It changed its mind and voted for
expulsion after the wife of a member of the board relayed a telephoned
message from the local superintendent of schools who had reported that one
of the disciplined students had started a fight at a basketball game that very
evening. This decision to expel was reiterated at a second session of the
board, held a week later at which the girls, their parents and counsel were
present. 389 A lawsuit was instituted under section 1983 requesting both
reinstatement and damages. 390 The district court handed down a directed
verdict for the defendants, concluding that there was no liability absent
381. Id. at 439.
382. Id. at 440.
383. 416 U.S. at 238.
384. Id. at 243.
385. Id. at 247-48.
386. Id. at 249-50.
387. 420 U.S..308 (1975).
388. Id. at 311.
389. Id. at 312-13.
390. Id. at 309-10.
[Vol. 4
proof of malice on the part of the board members.39 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It said that although the
school district was immune from suit,3 92 the same immunity did not extend
to individual board members. The court found a denial of substantive due
process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment3 93 and noted that the
board members would be liable if it was shown that they acted without good
faith, not without malice.
394
The Supreme Court sustained the opinion of the court of appeals.
Justice White's majority opinion said that failure to recognize a good faith
defense would unfairly impose upon a school administrator liability for his
immediate responses in crisis situations. 395 The Court rejected the option of
absolute immunity. 396 It instead chose to apply a "qualified good-faith
immunity" which it defined as follows:
Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we hold that
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he
took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student. . . A compen-
satory award will be appropriate only if the school board member
has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights
that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
faith.
397
It is useful to compare the standards set forth in Scheuer and Wood
with that laid down by the Second Circuit in its 1972 Bivens decision.398
The Second Circuit in Bivens developed a simple, manageable tripartite
test. First, it would consider whether the defendant official falls either
within that class of officials traditionally granted immunity at common law
for acts done within the scope of their duties or within that class of officials
granted a similar immunity because their function involves the performance
391. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244,250 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
392. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973).
393. Id. at 190.
394. Id. at 191. The court noted that good faith as a defense to a suit seeking injunctive
relief is usually judged by the standard of whether the administrator's decision was
"reasonble." Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970); Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1090 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811-12 (2d Cir.
1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961). See also
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 315-16 n.7.
395. 420 U.S. at 319.
396. Id. at 320.
397. Id. at 322.
398. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
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of discretionary acts. 399 Second, if the defendant official falls within either
of these two classes, a court must ascertain whether or not his acts were in
fact within the scope of his duties. 400 If they were, the suit must be
dismissed. If they were not, however, the court proceed to step three,
wherein the defendant official must prove both that he believed in good faith
that his conduct was lawful and that this belief was reasonable.
40
In contrast, the Scheuer-Wood test is confusing. It transmutes the
concept of "good faith" into one of "qualified immunity"; but this trans-
position is inadvisable. An immunity is a bar to a lawsuit while good faith is
only a defense. As Bivens suggests, a mere claim of good faith does not
require an appellate court to uphold a trial court's dismissal of a complaint.
If that claim of good faith is disputed by the plaintiff, there is a material
issue of fact which is triable.4°2 On the other hand, if there is a claim of
immunity, the appellate court can look to the law governing liability of
officials and if it finds that the claim is valid, the plaintiff is denied access to
the federal court. 403 By obfuscating these distinctions, the Supreme Court
has created semantic problems with which the lower federal courts will have
great difficulty. But one can say that the language in Scheuer retains the
essential concepts underlying a good faith defense as those concepts were
developed by the Second Circuit in Bivens. The same cannot be said for
Justice White's language in Wood. Bivens established that an official
defendant must prove a reasonable, good faith belief in the validity of his
conduct. Wood says that the official defendant is liable if he knew, or if he
reasonably should have known, or he maliciously intended, that his conduct
would deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Thus Justice White
substitutes the criterion of knowledge for one of belief. This would appear
to give the defendant far more protection than the standard provided in
Bivens.404 Additionally, Justice White adds the concepts of motivation and
399. Id. at 1342-43. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
400. Id. at 1343-47. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
401. Id. at 1347-48. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
402. Id. at 1348.
403. Id. at 1342.
404. Cf. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 62 (3d Cir. 1976): "While we can give
guidance to the district court as to where various burdens lie on the [ Wood] qualifications, we
are less confident of our ability to suggest by what criteria the reasonableness of the...
defendants' lack of knowledge of due process requirements should be measured. The district
court will be required to inquire into the status and responsibility of each individual defendant
and to determine whether, for example, a trustee should be held responsible for the same level
of knowledge of constitutional rights as a college president or a commissioner of education. The
determination may turn on the relative availability to each defendant of counsel, as well as the
relative certainty of the legal issue, a criterion to which the [Wood] court expressly adverted.
420 U.S. at 322. The federal courts will be entering largely unchartered [sic] waters here, for the
pre-existing role of unqualified official immunity meant that very little if any case law was
developed with respect to standards of liability for negligent mistakes of law by persons making
nonjudicial adjudications." See notes 392-94 and accompanying text supra.
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malice, the very concepts the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wood (which
Justice White purports to sustain) rebuked the district court for considering.
This element of malice would seem to accord the defendant official less
protection, because statements by the defendant that he did not know (and
should not have known) of the illegality of his conduct might be rebutted by
a showing of acts from which the nebulous notion of malice might be
inferred. But Justice White's analysis does not end there. He goes on to say
that suits for damages are appropriate only upon a showing of "impermiss-
ible motivation" or such disregard for "clearly established" constitutional
rights that bad faith may be inferred. This dual standard for suits seeking
monetary redress is, however, inherently confusing. "Impermissible moti-
vation" encompasses a variety of intents not necessarily limited to malice,
but "disregard of clearly established rights" seems to require the existence
of a constitutional right which is unquestionably present. This language
would permit the defendant official to claim that the right plaintiff alleges
that he was deprived of was not clearly established at the time of the conduct
complained of and therefore no remedy for the past conduct is allowable. 
40 5
Thus in a damage suit Wood seems to accord the defendant far more
protection than was provided by the Second Circuit in Bivens. One might
respond that Wood is limited to the "specific context of school discipline"
and, furthermore, should be restricted solely to section 1983 cases. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the first assertion is probably false 406 and
the lower federal courts in Bivens actions have been quick to follow the
guidelines set forth by Scheuer, and later, Wood.407
405. See also Morales v. Hamilton, 391 F. Supp. 85 (D. Ariz. 1975). There a plaintiff in a
Bivens action sought a retroactive application of the doctrine of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). (See note 208, supra). At the time, the Ninth Circuit permitted such
retroactivity. See United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1974). The district court
declined to follow the retroactivity rule on the theory that it would have the effect of creating an
ex post facto offense in violation of the dictates of the Constitution. 391 F. Supp. at 88.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the Peltier case also concluded that retroactive application
of Almeida-Sanchez would be unwarranted. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975).
See generally Note, The Extent of the Border, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (1974).
406. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,577 (1975). That case involved the conduct
of officials at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee. The Court remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), characterizing the latter
decision as one dealing with the immunity of state officials in general.
407. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 399, 401 (3d Cir. 1976); White v. Boyle,
538 F.2d 1077, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1976);
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 92-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 1974); States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1158-59 (4th Cir. 1974); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1298-99
(D.D.C. 1976); Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710, 718 (D. Colo. 1975); Morales v.
Hamilton, 391 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Ariz. 1975); La Verne v. Corning, 376 F. Supp. 836, 839-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975). Presumably, those courts which have
claimed that section 1983 precedents apply in Bivens types of actions would also deem
themselves bound by Scheuer and Wood. See note 285 supra.
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b. Selected Applications of Section 1983 Doctrines
It is interesting to consider how the doctrines of immunity and good
faith operate in a Bivens-based action. The following four cases typify the
kinds of problems encountered in wrestling with these issues. Though they
are not entirely representative of the usual Bivens suit (in that three of the
decisions deemed a cause of action to exist), they do illustrate the difficul-
ties attendant to a Bivens-based cause of action.
In Brawer v. Horowitz,4° 8 the plaintiffs were prison inmates serving a
sentence for transporting and conspiring to transport stolen United States
Treasury Bills. They sued, inter alia, under Bivens, alleging that the
prosecuting attorney and his chief witness at their trial combined to deprive
them of their Fifth Amendment rights.4°9 They sought monetary relief from
the witness in addition to requesting that their conviction be set aside. 410 At
the trial court level, a summary judgment was granted in favor of the
prosecuting attorney but a default judgment was obtained against the wit-
ness. 41' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
the immunity extended to prosecuting attorneys by the Supreme Court in
section 1983 litigation should also control in Bivens suits.4 12 It went on to
deal with the problem of whether or not the state's witness should be entitled
to immunity. It noted that in order effectively to enforce the criminal laws,
the government often had to rely on "inside" informants; in this case, the
witness had been relocated and given a new identity by federal officials.
4 13
As a result, the court applied the common law rule that a witness is not
civilly liable for "words spoken in office." 414 It noted that the interest of the
plaintiffs against having inflammatory or perjured testimony uttered by a
witness in their trial is best protected by a subsequent indictment for perjury,
by asking the trial judge to exclude the most egregious utterances and by
undermining the witness' credibility on cross-examination. 415 Thus a cause
of action against the prosecution's witness on the basis of Bivens failed.
408. 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
409. Id. at 832.
410. Id. at 832-33.
411. Id. at 833.
412. Id. at 834 (citing Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)).
413. 535 F.2d at 836.
414. Id. at 837. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 463, 474 (1909). Cf. Sacks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1932).
415. 535 F.2d at 837. Assuming arguendo that a prosecuting attorney and a witness conspire
to present perjured testimony, it would seem unlikely that the most formidable of these
sanctions (indictment for perjury) would emanate from the same prosecutor's office accused of
wrongdoing (provided, of course, that this was not an arbitrary, unilateral action by one
particular prosecutor).
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In VonderAhe v. Howland,416 the IRS audited the plaintiff, a doctor,
for the taxable years of 1966 and 1967. The doctor produced a set of patient
cards showing charges and collections for each patient. The audit went
without incident. Subsequently, a disgruntled former employee of the doctor
called the IRS and said that the doctor kept a second set of patient cards for
emergency cases; a second employee indicated where this second set of
cards might be found in the doctor's office. Apparently, checks received
from emergency patients were deposited in a Swiss bank account which had
not been disclosed either on the tax returns in question or during the audit.
IRS agents secured a "general warrant;" on June 16, 1970, they raided the
doctor's office and home, seizing thousands of documents in addition to the
emergency patient cards. As a result of the wholesale seizure of his patient
files, Doctor VonderAhe was forced to discontinue his practice for two
weeks until the IRS returned extraneous records. 417 The plaintiff sued under
Bivens, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. 418 At the trial court level,
the government's motion to dismiss was granted. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It found a patently unreasonable
search and seizure. It was true that there was enough probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant, but not a general warrant. The court said
that in seeking a general warrant, the agents became "responsible for its
breadth."*19 The court found it "difficult to belief that the draftsmen did not
insert 'unreasonable' to avoid just such an in terrorem state as the agents
created and wreaked here." 42 Moreover, the court criticized the manner of
the search. Since the agents knew what they wanted, they could have issued
a subpoena duces tecum; instead they engaged in a "sudden assault,"
impairing the practice of the plaintiff and the convenience and health of his
patients.42 1 The appellate court concluded that a valid cause of action was
stated under Bivens.422
In Rodriguez v. Ritchey,423 a truly bizarre case arose. During 1971 and
1972 the FBI conducted an investigation into organized gambling activities
in central Florida. The agent in charge was one Santoiana. Under his
command were, inter alia, agents Arwine, Batley and Kinne. As part of the
investigation, a pen register monitoring device was connected to the tele-
phone line of one Frank Vega, a suspect. This wiretap was monitored by
Batley. On October 5, 1971, Vega phoned one Margaret Waltz, whom he
416. 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974).
417. See id. at 365-68.
418. Id. at 372.
419. Id. at 369.
420. Id. at 370.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 372.
423. 539 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976).
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addressed as "Margo." Her telephone number was 935-0024; the pen
register recorded this number as 935-9024. None of the agents knew who
"Margo" was, so Santoiana assigned Arwine to the task of locating her
whereabouts. The number 935-9024 was that of a pay phone and therefore
unlisted. When Arwine was unable to locate it in the Criss Cross Telephone
Directory, he called up the General Telephone Company of Tampa. An
agent for the telephone company mistakenly identified the number as one
belonging to the plaintiff, Margaret Rodriguez. In fact, her number was
876-5646 and was listed in the directory. Arwine checked with the local
sheriff's office and learned Rodriguez had no prior arrests; a call to the
Greater Tampa Credit Bureau yielded Rodriguez's address. Arwine then
asked John Fairbanks, a local detective sergeant, if he had encountered
Rodriguez's name in a prior county gambling investigation. Fairbanks
replied that he did remember a Rodriguez who was a beautician. Since
Margaret Rodriguez operated a beauty parlor, Arwine believed he had clear-
cut corroboration that she was involved in organized gambling. In fact, the
Rodriguez Fairbanks referred to was an entirely different person. On March
3, 1972, Arwine phoned Margaret Rodriguez to compare her voice with that
on the wiretap tape of Vega's telephone line. As a response to a question in a
subsequent deposition clearly revealed, Arwine did not dial 935-9024 (the
number recorded on the pen register) because he had mislaid the slip of
paper bearing that number. Instead, he looked up Margaret Rodriguez's
number in the phone directory. When she answered the call, Arwine be-
lieved hers was the voice of the "Margo" Vega had spoken with. On the
same day, March 3, mass arrests were made by the FBI in the Tampa area.
Margaret Rodriguez was arrested by special agents Ritchey and Sosbee. A
magistrate released her on a surety bond. On March 13, 1973, over a year
later, Agent Kinne allowed Rodriguez and her attorney to listen to the tape
of the Vega-"Margo" conversation; the attorney said that the voice on the
tape was not that of his client. Kinne checked this allegation and discovered
that Margaret Rodriguez had indeed been misidentified. On May 31, 1973,
the charge against her was dismissed. She promptly sued agents Santoiana,
Kinne, Ritchey, Sosbee, Batley, and Arwine under Bivens, alleging depri-
vation of her Fourth Amendment rights. 424 The trial court granted summary
judgment for all the defendants. On appeal, the appellate court for the Third
Circuit reversed in part. Starting with the premise that the Bivens claim was
governed by rules developed in section 1983 proceedings, 421 the court
proceeded to consider the liability of each defendant individually. Batley
was found to be free from liability because he had neither instigated nor
424. For the facts of this case, see id. at 395-98, 402-03.
425. Id. at 399.
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participated in Rodriguez's arrest. 426 Agent Kinne had presented the evi-
dence to the grand jury which resulted in the indictment against Rodriguez;
but the court said there were no facts creating a "material dispute" as to his
good faith.427 Santoiana's summary judgment was upheld because no errors
in his supervision were responsible for Rodriguez's arrest. 428 Agents Ritch-
ey and Sosbee were deemed immune from suit for false arrest because they
acted on a valid warrant. 429 As to Arwine, however, the court said "the
conglomeration of errors committed by him was the vital link in the chain
which caused [Rodriguez] to be indicted and to suffer the treatment already
described."430 On that basis alone, summary judgment in favor of Arwine
was denied. 431
In Shifrin v. Wilson, 432 equally difficult problems were presented. On
May 1, 1972, Deputy General Counsel Kenneth Crosson of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department requested an opinion from the
district's Corporation Counsel, Gilbert Gimble, as to the constitutionality of
article two, section three of the district's police regulations (requiring a
permit from the chief of police before a speech could be delivered in a public
place). The request was rerouted in September of 1972 to Assistant Corpora-
tion Counsel David Eisenberg. He did not prepare a memorandum until
early March of 1973. Upon receipt of said memorandum, a circular was
drawn up by Police Chief Jerry Wilson indicating that the speech regulation
should no longer be enforced. This circular was issued to police officers on
March 21, 1973. Earlier, on February 9, 1973, plaintiff Shifrin stood in
front of the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., intending to deliver an
address against prison camps in the U.S.S.R. Because he lacked a permit to
speak, he was arrested. On March 20, 1973, the charges were dropped. 433
The plaintiff sued, inter alia, the police officers making the arrest, Police
Chief Wilson, and the corporation counsel and his assistant.434 It was
alleged that Wilson should not have enforced the regulation pending the
memorandum from the counsel; it was also alleged that the failure of the
corporation counsel's office to issue a prompt opinion on the regulation was
responsible for the deprivation of Shifrin's rights.435 As for John Connor,
426. Id. at 401-02.
427. Id. at 402.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 401 (citing Perry v. Jones, 506 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1975); Fleming v.
McEnany, 491 F.2d 1353, 1357 (2d Cir. 1974)).
430. 539 F.2d at 403.
431. Id. at 404.
432. 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1976).
433. Id. at 1287-88.
434. Id. at 1287.
435. Id. at 1288-89.
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the captain of the arresting officers, the district court applied the test of good
faith set down in the second Bivens opinion by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. It noted that since this was a defense and not
a bar to suit, any summary judgment for Connor was premature until he
tendered evidence of his good faith and reasonable belief.436 As he had not,
further proceedings on this issue were necessary.437 Similarly, summary
judgment for Police Chief Wilson was denied. The court found no common
law immunity shielding Wilson, but said "good faith-reasonableness qual-
ified immunity" as developed by Scheuer was applicable. 438 The court
again said the issue was a triable one and could not be dealt with on a motion
for summary judgment.439 As for the corporation counsel and his assistants,
the district court concluded that their liability was governed by whether or
not the delay in issuing an opinion on the constitutionality of the police
regulation was the "proximate cause" of the deprivation of Shifrin's First
Amendment rights, and proximate cause is an issue for the trier of fact.' 4
Prosecutorial immunity was denied to the corporation counsel and his staff
because they did not engage in any quasi-judicial or trial functions,441 but,
applying Scheuer, the district court found that these defendants were also
entitled to prove a defense of good faith and reasonableness at trial. 442
These decisions are surprising. In Brawer, a court of appeals unilater-
ally developed a new immunity for Bivens actions. In VonderAhe, federal
agents making a search and seizure under an admittedly valid warrant were
held to be subject to suit under Bivens because they could have acquired the
information they sought through less disruptive alternatives. The net effect
of Rodriguez and Shifrin is to create a cause of action under Bivens, not for
an intentional tort, but for negligence. One might respond that under the
tests announced in Scheuer v. Rhodes and Wood i. Strickland mere
negligence would not suffice to create a cause of action; 43 similarly, under
436. Id. at 1295. No immunity was found for Connor because the court looked to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967), which held that
police officers are not immune from suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
437. 412 F. Supp. at 1297.
438. Id. at 1298-99.
439. Id. at 1299-1300.
440. Id. at 1302 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), for the proposition that it
is permissible to take into account general principles of tort law). See text accompanying notes
441-52 infra. The district court noted the limitations imposed by the case of Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976), on actions under section 1983, but indicated that Rizzo had little bearing on
suits brought under section 1331(a). See 412 F. Supp. at 1301-02 n.22. See notes 458-69 and
accompanying text infra.
441. 412 F. Supp. at 1303-04. See Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Apton v.
Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th
Cir. 1970).
442. 412 F. Supp. at 1304-05.
443. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
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the doctrines of these decisions, the agents in VonderAhe would be entitled
to a "good faith-reasonableness qualified immunity" because they (rightful-
ly) believed that their general warrant validated their actions. Of course,
VonderAhe preceded Scheuer and Wood, so it may be differentiated on
that basis. But Rodriguez and Shifrin were decided in 1976, so how does
one explain the results achieved in those cases? One answer might be that
these two latter decisions were section 1331(a), not section 1983, actions, so
the Third Circuit and the district court of the District of Columbia were not
obliged to abide by precedents developed in different legal contexts. But
that answer is too simplistic; both courts stated they were obliged to abide
by the rulings in section 1983 cases. 444 In sum, what these decisions seem to
suggest is that lower federal courts are at liberty to select which section
1983 rulings they desire to be bound by.
VonderAhe, Rodriguez, and Shifrin also indicate that lower federal
courts are, on occasion, willing to accord less protection to an official
defendant than the Second Circuit granted in its 1972 Bivens decision.
Certainly the good faith-reasonable belief defense developed in the latter
case would seem to require a different result than the one reached in
VonderAhe. I But the proper response to that contention is that the Ninth
Circuit was utterly free to invent its own criteria for a valid defense and it
did so. Of course the same is true of the courts in Rodriguez and Shifrin.
Until the Supreme Court conclusively addresses the issue, such judicial
inventiveness and independence are entirely permissible decision-making
techniques.
III. The Future of a Bivens Type of Action
The question this article sought to explore is: what advantage is there in
suing on the basis of Bivens? As has been shown, in comparing a Bivens
claim and a section 1983 cause of action, the former has some distinct
attractions. In contrast to a section 1983 suit, one can, under Bivens, sue
counties446 and municipalities, 7 sue under the theory of respondeat
superior in some jurisdictions, 4 8 and possibly confront less stringent de-
fenses to suit.4 9 As interpreted by the lower federal court, moreover, the
differences between a section 1983 action and a Bivens claim that made the
former remedial source seem attractive have been dissipated. Thus, in many
444. See Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 399,401 (3d Cir. 1976); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412
F. Supp. 1282, 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1976).
445. It might also be argued that the Second Circuit's 1972 Bivens decision was limited
solely to suits against police officials, because of the particular factors justifying a policy that
ensures that such officers are entitled to certain wide-ranging defenses to a lawsuit. See note 75
and accompanying text supra.
446. See notes 321, 323 and accompanying text supra.
447. See notes 87, 93, 323 and accompanying text supra.
448. See notes 258, 261 and accompanying text supra.
449. See notes 423-42 and accompanying text supra.
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jurisdictions, a Bivens suit not only can be brought against state officials
and entities,45 but also can be utilized to vindicate a variety of constitutional
rights other than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 45 1 In some
jurisdictions, Bivens is deemed to be an independent source of equitable
relief;452 in all jurisdictions, equitable relief can be sought concurrently
(against either state453 or federal 454 officials) with a Bivens-based claim for
damages. In some jurisdictions, too, punitive damages may be recoverable
in a Bivens cause of action. 455 The one major difference between section
1983 lawsuits and Bivens claims that is still significant is the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement, but that requirement has, more often
than not, been liberally construed by lower federal courts. 456 But interpret-
ing Bivens as an overly generous source of a federal remedy for any claim
falling under the rubric of "constitutional tort" has led and, no doubt, will
continue to lead to occasionally questionable results and even more ques-
tionable complaints.
457
Nevertheless, one can say why the remedy created in Bivens is being
utilized. First, at least as against federal officials, it is still the only monetary
remedy available in federal courts. Second, as against state officials and
entities, it has become perhaps a more productive remedial source than
section 1983. This argument can be illustrated by considering two opinions
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1976 which will have far-reaching
impact on the potential for success on any section 1983 claim.
The first of these decisions was Rizzo v. Goode.458 In 1970, two suits
were lodged against, inter alia, the mayor, the city managing director, and
the police commissioner of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs sought equitable
450. See note 323 and accompanying text supra.
451. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
452. See note 203 and accompanying text supra.
453. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
454. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
455. See note 159 and accompanying text supra.
456. See notes 154-58 and accompanying text supra.
457. The cases allowing a Bivens cause of action to be stated against private parties are
good examples of what this author deems to be questionable complaints. These complaints are
best typified by those assuming that the decision in Bivens somehow abrogated the sovereign
immunity of the federal government. The courts have consistently disabused plaintiffs of this
notion. Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850, 852 (2d Cir. 1976); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States, 515 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1975); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381,
1387 (D.R.I. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1159 (Ist Cir. 1973); Smallwood v.
United States, 358 F. Supp. 398, 405 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of
Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1975). But see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1554-59 (1972). Sometimes, however, courts fail to dismiss
frivolous concepts; at least one district court has indicated in a dictum that Bivens may serve as
a means of vindicating not only rights arising under the Constitution, but also arising under a
law of the United States. Rodriguez v. Barcelo, 358 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.P.R. 1973).
458. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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relief in the form of intervention in and supervision over the city's police
force; it was alleged that the police systematically mistreated minority
citizens.459 After a good deal of procedural skirmishing, 46° a federal district
court handed down a lengthy opinion concluding that there was an organized
pattern of oppression against non-whites by members of Philadelphia's
police force.4 6 1 Rather than intervening directly into the internal operations
of a municipal police department, 462 the district judge ordered the defend-
ants before it to revise police manuals so that they would clearly state the
boundaries of permissible police conduct in dealing with civilians. In addi-
tion, they were to revise procedures for processing complaints against police
officers by making available complaint forms to civilians, to develop a
procedure to screen out frivolous complaints, ensure a full and prompt
investigation of all legitimate complaints, and provide for a fair adjudication
of whether or not a given charge was frivolous by creating an impartial,
independent board which would hold sessions at which the complainant and
the police officer could state their respective cases. Last, defendants were
instructed to promptly notify complainants of the eventual disposition of their
charges .463 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirm-
ed this decree, deeming it adequate to prevent further police misconduct.
464
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
noted that the police officers who had allegedly deprived the respondents
of their constitutional rights were not named as parties to the original suit;
the only causal connection between the petitioners and the incidents of
police misconduct was the fact that they were nominally in charge of the
operation of the city's police department. 465 There was no showing that the
petitioners approved or knew of the misconduct of the individual police
officers; nor was there any showing that failure to grant equitable relief
would have resulted in continuing harm to the respondents themselves as
distinct from the classes of persons they sought to represent. 66 Thus Justice
Rehnquist indicated that the respondents (plaintiffs in the district court)
459. Id. at 366-67.
460. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1290-92 (E.D. Pa. 1973), for a procedural
history of this litigation.
461. Id. at 1319.
462. The district court did, however, indicate that it had the inherent equitable power to
intervene and enforce standards of its own devising if it wished. Id. at 1320. Other courts have
done exactly that with respect to different types of state institutions. See, e.g., Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127-34 (D. Hawaii 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53,
78 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976); Martarella v. Kelly, 359 F. Supp. 478,
483-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 768-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp.
1354, 1372-74 (D.R.I. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
modified and enf'd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
463. 357 F. Supp. at 1321.
464. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 1974).
465. 423 U.S. at 371.
466. Id.
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lacked standing to sue. 4 6 7 He went on to discuss the scope of injunctive
relief available under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. One limit on the
equitable powers of federal courts under section 1983 was the "principle of
federalism." Thus Justice Rehnquist said:
When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system
: * . to a system of federal courts representing the Nation, subsist-
ing side by side with 50 state judicial, legislative, and executive
branches, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of
federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable
relief.468
For these reasons it was said that equitable relief under section 1983 could
be invoked only in "the most extraordinary circumstances."
469
The second far-reaching decision by the Supreme Court interpreting
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act was Paul v. Davis.470 Fifteen years
earlier, in the case of Monroe v. Pape,471 the Court had indicated that
section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."472
The decision in Paul urged a far different reading of the statute. In this case
Davis was arrested on June 14, 1971, on a charge of shoplifting. He was
arraigned in September of 1971 and pled not guilty. The charge was filed
away with leave to reinstate. In late 1972, petitioner Paul, the chief of police
in Louisville, Kentucky, issued a flyer to local merchants displaying the
names and photographs of "active shoplifters." Davis' name and photo
were among those shown. Shortly after the circulation of the flyer, a judge
in a Louisville Police Court dismissed the shoplifting case against Davis.
4 73
The latter sued under section 1983, seeking damages and injunctive re-
lief.474 The trial court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the alleged facts con-
stituted a denial of due process of law. 475 The court of appeals concluded
that the stigma created by having one's name and likeness included in a
pamphlet purporting to list active criminals without any notice or hearing
whatsoever violated the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.476
467. Id. at 372-73.
468. Id. at 379 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975)).
469. 423 U.S. at 379.
470. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
471. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
472. Id. at 187.
473. 424 U.S. at 694-96.
474. Id. at 696.
475. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1182 (6th Cir. 1974).
476. Id. at 1184. As support for the contention that honor and reputation were liberties
subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court of appeals cited, interalia,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
437 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 316-17 (1946). See 505 F.2d at 1182-83.
[Vol. 4
BIVENS AND ITS PROGENY
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
found in this case an instance of defamation per se, but said that such an
offense does not give rise to a constitutional cause of action. Any other
view, he averred, "would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally
cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting
under 'color of law' establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." '4 77 Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment
should not be construed as the source of some far-reaching federal law of
torts:
Respondent, however, has pointed to no specific constitutional
guarantee safeguarding the interest he asserts has been invaded.
Rather, he apparently believes that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause should ex proprio vigore extend to him a right
to be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as the
tortfeasor. But such a reading would make of the Fourteenth
Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States. We have noted
the "constitutional shoals" that confront any attempt to derive
from congressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal
tort law, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,101-102 (1971); a
fortiori the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause
cannot be the source for such law. 478
Thus the Court found that reputation alone, considered separately from
some tangible property interest like employment, is insufficient to invoke
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 479 In a
dictum, Justice Rehnquist noted that any right of privacy enjoyed by re-
spondent Davis which would prohibit the public disclosure of his arrest on a
shoplifting charge was also a similarly non-protected interest.
480
The impact of Rizzo and Paul on section 1983 litigation is as yet
unclear. Rizzo does seem to require that injunctive relief in section 1983
cases be limited to only the most egregious situations. Given the fact that the
district court in Rizzo did not even intervene directly, but only asked local
officials to draw up their own procedures (conforming to certain minimum
guidelines), 481 the Supreme Court's position would seem to be that any
judicial intrusion into the internal operations of state and local institutions
must meet stringent criteria of justifiability. Additionally, Rizzo seems to
say that section 1983 will not reach acts of official negligence which result
in the actual deprivation of constitutional rights. 482 Paul v. Davis apparently
477. 424 U.S. at 699.
478. Id. at 700-01.
479. Id. at 701. The cases cited by the court of appeals (see note 476 supra) were
distinguished on this basis. See id at 701-10.
480. Id. at 712-13. See Note, Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy:
The Development of the Remedy in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 554-55 (1976).
481. See note 463 and accompanying text supra.
482. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 384-85 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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holds that the impugning of one's reputation without a concomitant depriva-
tion of some property right is not actionable under section 1983.483 Interpre-
tation of RiZZo 4 84 and Pau1485 has yielded varying and sometimes inconsis-
483. See Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080-81 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
484. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1069 (7th Cir. 1976) (held in suit
seeking to enjoin random harassment of Chicanos by Immigration & Naturalization Service
agent that Rizzo does not preclude enforcement of a prohibitory, as distinct from a mandatory,
injunction); Diaz Gonzalez v. Colon Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 453, 458 (Ist Cir. 1976) (held in suit
seeking reinstatement in the Puerto Rican Department of Social Services that the principles of
federalism enunciated in Rizzo precluded such tampering with the internal affairs of local
governnent); Calvin v. Conlisk, 534 F.2d 1251, 1252 (7th Cir. 1976) (held in suit seeking to
enjoin alleged misconduct of Chicago police that the doctrine of Rizzo barred any relief because
named plaintiffs could not show any likelihood of immediate harm to them); Frederick L. v.
Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960, 976 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (suggested Rizzo might not bar judicial
enforcement of individualized educational services for children with learning disabilities upon
proof of invidious discrimination in the furnishing of such services by a municipality); Mayber-
ry v. Maroney, 418 F. Supp. 669, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (said Rizzo barred injunctive interference
with the internal operations and conditions of a state penitentiary); McKee v. Breier, 417 F.
Supp. 189, 190-91 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (said in suit against police officials for alleged misconduct,
Rizzo did not apply where plaintiffs sought money damages and when chief of police "failed to
act at a time when he knew that individual civil rights were being violated"); DeMaria v. Jones,
416 F. Supp. 291, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (held suit alleging federal drug agents "coerced"
plaintiffs into committing criminal and immoral acts did not state a cause of action under
Rizzo); Delaney v. Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Mass. 1976) (held Rizzo inapplicable
where suit against police sought only $2,000,000 in damages and where no pattern of
misconduct was alleged); Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 973 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (held in
school desegregation suit that Rizzo is inapplicable where it is alleged state and city defendants
created and maintained segregated schools); Roach v. Kligman, 412 F. Supp. 521,528 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (held in suit seeking to enjoin continuation of allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions
that mere fact that superintendent of prisons exercised "close supervision and control" is not
enough to state a cause of action under Rizzo); League of United Latin American Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 886 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (said in suit alleging discrimina-
tory hiring practices that Rizzo does not apply where claim rests on an immediate injury, not
future speculation); Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 508
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (held where discriminatory practices sought to be enjoined were sanctioned by
state law, and mayor and officials participated in decisions enforcing such law, Rizzo did not
bar injunctive remedy).
485. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1976) (held prison guard's
negligent loss of plaintiff-inmate's trial transcript not actionable under Paul); Sullivan v.
Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1976) (held mere reprimand and transferral of a tenured
teacher not actionable under Paul); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1976) (said
Paul permits a suit where stigma to reputation is coupled with failure to rehire); Walker v.
Callahan, 542 F.2d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 1976) (held that letter from county prosecutor allegedly
defaming plaintiff was not actionable under the theory of Paul); Edelberg v. Illinois Racing Bd.,
540 F.2d 279, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1976) (held in suit challenging constitutionality of Racing Board
rule denying winnings to owner of any horse which has allegedly been drugged that no action
for injury to reputation was possible because of Paul); Ryan v. Aurora City Bd. of Educ., 540
F.2d 222, 226 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976) (teachers denied contract renewals without any reasons being
given had no cause of action because, as in Paul, no right was guaranteed to them under state
law); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361,365 (9th Cir. 1976) (held Paul didn't
bar a suit where a doctor suffered stigma to reputation and dismissal from defendant hospital's
residency program); Harris v. Harvey, 419 F. Supp. 30, 32 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (held defamation of
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tent results on the part of the lower federal courts, so it is premature to
attempt to assess the overall consequences of these decisions. But these
decisions are restrictive and they do limit both the availability and the
desirability of a section 1983 action. By contrast, one can argue that these
decisions do not affect section 1331(a) litigation brought under the princi-
ples announced in Bivens. The Court in Rizzo and Paul never mentioned a
Bivens cause of action. Moreover, the limits on injunctive relief created by
Rizzo would not seem to affect a Bivens suit, which is properly only a suit
for damages. Similarly, much of the discussion in Paul is inapposite in the
context of a Bivens claim because the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens
was consciously intended to create a species of federal tort law. One may
argue that Rizzo's refusal to permit injunctive relief in cases of official
negligence should apply in suits seeking equitable relief under section
133 1(a), but at least one court has openly questioned this thesis.486 Thus, it
would seem that the plaintiff seeking to redress constitutional violations by
state officials might have a better opportunity in at least being able to litigate
his claim by suing under a combination of Bivens and section 1331(a),
rather than proceeding under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
Conclusion
The lower federal courts have made the Supreme Court's decision in
Bivens a prolific source of substantive constitutional law involving tortious
deprivations of rights guaranteed by the first nine and the Fourteenth
Amendments. Should the Supreme Court take the opportunity to review its
Bivens decision, what can be expected? It should be noted that two of the
six justices who voted for a damage remedy in Bivens (Justices Harlan and
Douglas) are no longer serving on the Court. Of the four remaining justices,
only Justices Marshall and Brennan have indicated a willingness to expand
plaintiff by district attorney not actionable under Paul); Colorado Seminary (Univ. of Denver)
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 417 F. Supp. 885, 896 (D. Colo. 1976) (held alleged
defamation caused by imposition of NCAA sanctions not actionable under Paul); Howlett v.
Walker, 417 F. Supp. 84, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (held defamation of political candidate didn't
deprive same of any "right or status," as Paul requires) i Tomko v. Lees, 416 F. Supp. 1137,
1139 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (held in suit allaging police coerced plaintiff to acf as an informant that
Paul does not bar section 1983 suit alleging deprivation of "freedom of choice"); De Maria v.
Jones, 416 F. Supp. 291, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cited Paul as one reason for denying monetary
relief in suit alleging entrapment); Shore v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
(dismissed discrimination suit saying that Paul permits defamation action under section 1983
only if plaintiff can prove actual defamation, governmental action depriving the individual of a
right previously held under state law, and occurrence of the defamation in the course of
government action); Roach v. Kligman, 412 F. Supp. 521,528 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (held allegation of
gross negligence will not give rise to a section 1983 suit because of Paul); Connealy v. Walsh,
412 F. Supp. 146, 159 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (held in suit alleging termination of plaintiff's employ-
ment because she refused to remove a "McGovern for President" bumper sticker from her car
that Paul permits suit whenever charges creating a stigma "involve imputation of illegal,
dishonest or immoral conduct which call into question the former empldyee's good name, honor
or integrity.")
486. See note 440 supra.
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Bivens beyond its original scope. 487 This author suspects that a majority of
the other justices sitting on the Court will be unlikely to allow a plaintiff to
do under Bivens and section 1331(a) what cannot presently be done under
section 1983. Nevertheless, until the Court hands down a conclusive ruling,
the lower federal courts are free to continue to extend the scope of Bivens.
The consequences flowing from these observations are interesting. If
one believes that, on balance, the extension of the remedy of Bivens is a
desirable goal, then the inaction of the Supreme Court is a salutary
phenomenon. By adopting a laissez-faire stance toward Bivens, the Court
has, in effect, tacitly encouraged the jurisprudential creativity being display-
ed by tribunals in the lower echelons of the federal judiciary. The costs of
such independent inventiveness are lack of uniformity and inconsistency,
but from the perspective of the plaintiff seeking to vindicate his constitution-
al rights, these may be a small price to pay for the privilege of having a
relatively efficacious means of redress in federal court.
487. See notes 77, 91 and accompanying text supra.
